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Towards a Transatlantic Concept of
Data Privacy
Erdem Büyüksagis*
Due to ever-growing big data and the ease with which
information can be transmitted over the Internet, it has become
more complicated for individuals to enjoy their rights to access,
to rectify and erase personal information, and for the judiciary
to apply conventional privacy law rules, such as consent,
transparency, and purpose limitation. On both sides of the Atlantic,
this phenomenon has motivated legislatures and courts to extend
protective measures in data privacy. Nevertheless, data protection
standards in the United States and the European Union (“EU”)
appear to many observers to be radically different and even
mutually incompatible. The European Court of Justice’s ruling in
Google Spain led many to assume that EU law gives more
importance to data protection than does U.S. law.
In this Article, I argue that the United States and the EU do in
fact give similar levels of legal and regulatory protection to private
data. Despite the Google Spain decision, the absence of an explicit
reference to privacy or data protection in the U.S. Constitution, and
cultural differences regarding the value placed on privacy between
these jurisdictions, critics have not offered any convincing argu-
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ments to show that either the perception of privacy or the consequences of its violation are radically different in the United States
and in Europe. First, when assessing whether private data gathered
by governments agencies or private businesses ought to be made
available to the general public, courts in both jurisdictions take into
account the nature of the information in question, its sensitivity for
the data subject’s privacy, the data subject’s identity, the reasons
behind the storage and disclosure of the information, and the
public’s interest in the information. My point is illustrated by the
fact that courts in the United States and the EU rely upon similar
tests to deal with potential data breaches. Second, particularly since
the adoption of the General Data Protection Regulation, data
protection is on the agenda of a number of state legislatures in the
United States. The adoption of the California Consumer Privacy Act
constitutes a non-negligible shift in the nation’s data privacy
regime, since its effective territorial reach will not be limited to
California, but will involve all the states given as the headquarters
of hundreds of high technology companies that are based in the
region commonly known as “Silicon Valley.”
My analysis leads me to the conclusion that the regulatory and
case law developments on both sides of the Atlantic hint at a
harmonization process of data protection standards because of the
ever-growing recognition of the need for specific data protection
laws and their substantive convergence.
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INTRODUCTION
In Oscar Wilde’s play “An Ideal Husband,” one of its characters,
Mrs. Cheveley, asserts that no man is “rich enough . . . to buy back
[his] past.”1 Wilde’s idea has continuing validity in our digital age,
where information technology compresses time into a “perpetual”2
present and creates a “digital panopticon.”3 This phenomenon,
which puts private life no more than a few keystrokes away from

1

OSCAR WILDE, AN IDEAL HUSBAND act 1, at 46 (The Floating Press 2008) (1895).
Michael L. Rustad & Sanna Kulevska, Reconceptualizing the Right to Be Forgotten
to Enable Transatlantic Data Flow, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 349, 416 (2015).
3
VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE DIGITAL
AGE 197 (2009) (referring to Bentham’s panopticon). A panopticon permits a watchman
to watch occupants without the occupants knowing whether or not they are being observed.
See The Panopticon, U.C. LONDON, https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bentham-project/who-wasjeremy-bentham/panopticon [https://perma.cc/26QQ-7GCE].
2
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anyone connected to the global Internet, unavoidably shrinks the
respect data controllers4 have for data subjects’ autonomy.5
Data privacy issues arise, in general, from a mass violation of
data subjects’ autonomy.6 Reflecting the large scale of this violation,
litigation of this issue in the United States has tended to take the
form of class-action lawsuits. The class-action lawsuits filed against

4

According to the OECD Privacy Guidelines, a “data controller” is defined as the
“party who, according to national law, is competent to decide about the contents and use
of personal data regardless of whether or not such data are collected, stored, processed or
disseminated by that party or by an agent on its behalf.” ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION
AND DEV., THE OECD PRIVACY FRAMEWORK 13 (2013), www.oecd.org/sti/
ieconomy/oecd_privacy_framework.pdf [https://perma.cc/86TW-A83G].
5
According to the OECD Privacy Guidelines, a “data subject” is the natural person
who is identified, or can be identified, by reference to her or his personal data. Id.
6
James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L.
REV. 1, 58 (2003) (discussing “holes in this patchwork of sector-specific privacy laws”).
For a comparison with EU law, see PAUL B. LAMBERT, UNDERSTANDING THE NEW
EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION RULES 12 (2018) (arguing that the “issue-by-issue
approach . . . leaves many gaps and areas not covered by data protection in the United
States”); Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 586 (2014) (asserting that “[c]omparisons between
privacy regulation in the United States and European Union have often pointed out E.U.
law’s comprehensiveness in contrast with U.S. law’s fragmentation and hollow standards,
which provide few limits on the collection, use, and disclosure of personal data”).
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Facebook,7 Equifax,8 Target,9 Yahoo!,10 Home Depot,11 Sony Pictures,12 Anthem,13 and Ashley Madison14 illustrate the problem of
7

In March 2018, Facebook declared that the personal data of 87 million users
worldwide had been collected through an app from November 2013 to May 2015 and
transferred to Cambridge Analytica, a political consulting firm. Millions of users’ data was
accessed and exploited, without the data subjects’ consent, to create politically useful
profiling and micro-target citizens, giving campaign groups the ability to connect with
individual voters. In January 2019, a complaint was filed with the Federal Trade
Commission accusing Facebook of misleading practices. The plaintiffs alleged that
personal health information about positive HIV diagnoses, sexual histories, details of past
sexual abuse, substance abuse disorders, and a wide range of health and mental health
conditions disclosed by users of closed Facebook groups had been made public. Sarah
Tejares, FTC Accuses Facebook of Revealing Sensitive Health Data in Group, MED. DAILY
(Feb. 19, 2019, 5:42 AM), www.medicaldaily.com/ftc-accuses-facebook-revealingsensitive-health-data-group-429927 [https://perma.cc/U4H9-E5XK].
8
Equifax, one of the nation’s largest credit reporting companies, has recently revealed
a massive data breach that affected more than 148 million Americans. In its statements
made in 2017 and 2018, the company reported that the names and dates of birth of
approximately 147 million people were exposed, as well as 145.5 million Social Security
numbers, the address information for 99 million people, the gender data for 27.3 million
people, 20.3 million consumers’ phone numbers, 17.6 million driver’s license numbers, 1.8
million email addresses, 209,000 credit card numbers and expiration dates, and 97,500 tax
ID numbers. See Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Equifax to Pay $575 Million
as Part of Settlement with FTC, CFPB, and States Related to 2017 Data Breach (July 22, 2019),
www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/07/equifax-pay-575-million-partsettlement-ftc-cfpb-states-related [https://perma.cc/G9B6-7E8Z]. See also Thomas
Brewster, Equifax Just Got Fined up to $700 Million for That Massive 2017 Hack, FORBES
(July 22, 2019), www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2019/07/22/equifax-just-gotfined-up-to-700-million-for-that-massive-2017-hack/#4c96c33c3e96
[https://perma.cc/LRU3-PBQX].
9
Target failed to identify a subcontractor’s lax security and was thus the victim of a
sophisticated hacking attack that resulted in 40 million customers’ debit and credit cards
being exposed and 70 million customers’ nonfinancial personal information being stolen.
See Rachel Abrams, Target to Pay $18.5 Million to 47 States in Security Breach Settlement,
N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/23/business/targetsecurity-breach-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/C2EG-VY5W]; Jonathan Stempel &
Nandita Bose, Target in $39.4 Million Settlement with Banks over Data Breach, REUTERS
(Dec. 2, 2015), www.reuters.com/article/us-targetbreach-settlement/target-in-39-4-million
-settlement-with-banks-over-data-breach-idUSKBN0TL20Y20151203
[https://perma.cc/G5RM-7CXW].
10
In September 2016, Yahoo confirmed that it had experienced a huge data breach in
late 2014 in which 500 million users’ PII, encrypted passwords, and in some cases security
questions were hacked by a “state-sponsored actor.” Three months later, the company
revealed another and even more important hack resulting in the data of over 1 billion users
being compromised in August 2013. See Nicole Perlroth, Yahoo Says Hackers Stole Data
on 500 Million Users in 2014, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2016), www.nytimes.com/2016/09/
23/technology/yahoo-hackers.html; [https://perma.cc/QED3-P8UB]; Vindu Goel & Nicole
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data privacy protection, and explain why most people think that their
personal privacy may gradually come to an end unless corrective
Perlroth, Yahoo Says 1 Billion User Accounts Were Hacked, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/technology/yahoo-hack.html
[https://perma.cc/
38J6-G2CQ].
11
In 2014, hackers used malware that infected the Home Depot payment systems and
compromised 56 million customers. The hackers reportedly remained in the company’s
computers, unnoticed, for about five months. See Melvin Blackman, Home Depot: 56
Million Cards Exposed in Breach, CNN (Sept. 18, 2014), http://money.cnn.com/2014/
09/18/technology/security/home-depot-hack [https://perma.cc/FKZ7-NNRW]; Jonathan
Stempel, Home Depot Settles Consumer Lawsuit over Big 2014 Data Breach, REUTERS
(Mar. 8, 2016), www.reuters.com/article/us-home-depot-breachsettlement-idUSKCN0
WA24Z [https://perma.cc/9RDF-TQUK].
12
In 2014, entertainment company Sony experienced an extensive data breach that
disclosed a huge amount of intellectual property and sensitive personal information. In the
days following the public disclosure of the breach, the hackers started leaking yetunreleased films, unfinished manuscripts and eight portions of the estimated twenty-five
gigabytes of sensitive or confidential data they had stolen. See David E. Sanger & Martin
Fackler, N.S.A. Breached North Korean Networks Before Sony Attack, Officials Say, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 18, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/19/world/asia/nsa-tapped-intonorth-korean-networks-before-sony-attack-officials-say.html
[https://perma.cc/PE8H2CYJ]; Jody Godoy, Sony to Pay up to $4.5M to Settle Employee’s Breach Suit, LAW360
(Oct. 20, 2015), www.law360.com/articles/716417/sony-to-pay-up-to-4-5m-to-settle
employees-breach-suit [https://perma.cc/L9VN-NTWR] .
13
Several massive hacks have been directed at the healthcare sector, a trend that is likely
to go on given the high value of personal medical information. In 2015, for instance, close
to 80 million personal records were stolen from Anthem, a large medical insurance
company, as a result of questionable internal storage. See Joseph Conn, Legal Liabilities
in Recent Data Breach Extend Far Beyond Anthem, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Feb. 23, 2015),
https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20150223/NEWS/302239977/legal-liabilitiesin-recent-data-breach-extend-far-beyond-anthem [https://perma.cc/4848-EDHA]; Bruce
Japsen, Hackers Stole Data on 80 Million Anthem Customers. Why Wasn’t It Encrypted?,
FORBES (Feb. 6, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/2015/02/06/anthemdidnt-encrypt-personal-data-and-privacy-laws-dont-require-it/#bdff22d4593e
[https://perma.cc/YE54-WXLT].
14
An anonymous hacker group calling itself “The Impact Team” hacked into the online
cheating website and menaced to release the stolen information unless the owners
permanently shut down the site. As the website owners refused, the hackers uploaded
around thirty gigabytes of stolen data onto the dark web, thus exposing the personal account
information of the site’s users, as well as data about the company and its employees. See
Chris Baraniuk, Ashley Madison: ‘Suicides’ over Website Hack, BBC (Aug. 24, 2015),
www.bbc.com/news/technology-34044506 [https://perma.cc/ZPJ9-FP7K]; Brian Krebs,
Online Cheating Site Ashley Madison Hacked, KREBS ON SECURITY (July 15, 2015),
http://krebsonsecurity.com/2015/07/online-cheating-site-ashleymadison-hacked
[https://perma.cc/34TU-BC82]; Kim Zetter, Ashley Madison Hackers Release an Even
Bigger Batch of Data, WIRED (Aug. 20, 2015, 3:01 PM), https://www.wired.com/2015/08/
ashley-madison-hackers-release-even-bigger-batch-data/ [https://perma.cc/6A5P-9KVY].

2019] TOWARDS A TRANSATLANTIC CONCEPT OF DATA PRIVACY

145

actions are taken. Some individual15 as well as class actions16
brought against Google on privacy and data security related issues
in the European Union (“EU”) reflect similar concerns regarding
data consent policies that do not give users enough control over the
way their information is collected and processed.
The growing concern has prompted lawmakers on both sides
of the Atlantic to introduce new laws and proposals to address
threats to privacy and data security. The EU legislature replaced
the 1995 Data Protection Directive with the General Data Protection
Regulation (“GDPR”),17 and unified data protection within the
EU.18 Article 3 of the GDPR reads that the Regulation applies to
“the processing of personal data in the context of the activities of an
establishment of a controller or a processor in the [European] Union,
regardless of whether the processing takes place in the [European]
Union or not.”19 This centralized approach significantly lessened
the burden on information technology businesses, since they no
longer have to comply with the various sensitivities of each EU
member state.20
In the United States, some legislative efforts at the state level,
like the newly adopted California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”),
aim at strengthening consumers’ privacy rights in a limited
geographical area,21 whereas a diverse collection of different types
15

See, e.g., Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de
Datos, 2014 E.C.R. 317.
16
Following the fine imposed by France’s data watchdog on Google for failing to
implement adequate measures to meet the requirements of the GDPR, in June 2019, a
French consumer group filed a class-action against Google for improper collection of
location tracking data. See French Consumer Group Files Class-Action Against Google for
Alleged GDPR Violations, IAPP (June 27, 2019), https://iapp.org/news/a/frenchconsumer-group-files-class-action-against-google-for-alleged-gdpr-violations/
[https://perma.cc/6TS6-EPX7].
17
Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016
on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and
on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data
Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR].
18
LAMBERT, supra note 6, at 12.
19
GDPR, supra note 17, art. 3.
20
Lisa Owings, The Right to Be Forgotten, 9 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 45, 62 (2015).
21
California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.198(a) (2018). For
an analysis see Lydia de la Torre, A Guide to the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018,
SANTA CLARA U., https://ssrn.com/abstract=3275571 [https://perma.cc/8ZJ4-URCM]; Eric
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of rules govern privacy and data protection at the national level.22
Obviously, some sensibilities about privacy differ between the
United States, with its solid free-speech tradition,23 and Europe, with
its painful experience of Nazi propaganda.24 The different attitudes
towards privacy lead, in turn, to diverse legislative schemes impacting the method of protection.25 Although there have been some
signs of change,26 the data protection policy of the United States

Goldman, An Introduction to the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), IAPP (July 9,
2018), https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/Intro_to_CCPA.pdf [https://perma.cc/
VR8N-H9X3].
22
On these rules, see Dorothy J. Glancy, At the Intersection of Visible and Invisible
Worlds: United States Privacy Law and the Internet, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 357, 359 (2000); 37th Int’l Privacy Conference Amsterdam 2015, Privacy
Bridges, EU AND US PRIVACY EXPERTS IN SEARCH OF TRANSATLANTIC PRIVACY SOLUTIONS
16–17
(2015),
https://privacybridges.mit.edu/sites/default/files/documents/Privacy
Bridges-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UPA-JLUP] [hereinafter Privacy Bridges];
Cameron F. Kerry, Filling the Gaps in US Data Privacy Laws, BROOKINGS INST. (July 12,
2018), www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2018/07/12/filling-the-gaps-in-u-s-data-privacy
-laws [https://perma.cc/9XCM-BYHC]. It is worth noting that a number of state
constitutions, namely those of Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois,
Louisiana, Montana, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Washington, expressly provide
for a right to information privacy. See Privacy Protections in State Constitutions, NAT’L
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Nov. 7, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecom
munications-and-information-technology/privacy-protections-in-state-constitutions.aspx
[https://perma.cc/N3H5-9R7Q].
23
Glancy, supra note 22, at 355–66; Jean-Marie Kamatali, The Limits of the First
Amendment: Protecting American Citizens’ Free Speech in the Era of the Internet & the
Global Marketplace of Ideas, 33 WIS. INT’L L.J. 101, 130 (2016).
24
Tracie B. Loring, An Analysis of the Informational Privacy Protection Afforded by the
European Union and the United States, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 421, 423 (2002); see also
JACQUELINE KLOSEK, THE WAR ON PRIVACY 78 (2007) (noting that “[i]n the years
following World War II, in light of the horrors raised by the holocaust, governments were
sensitive to the importance of respecting their citizens’ right to maintain the privacy of
certain personal information”); Michael W. Heydrich, A Brave New World: Complying
with the European Union Directive on Personal Privacy Through the Power of Contract,
25 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 407, 417 (1999).
25
See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy, Dignity Versus Liberty,
113(6) YALE L.J. 1151, 1155 (2004) (The author argues that “[t]o the Europeans . . . it often
seems obvious that Americans do not understand the imperative demands of privacy at all.”
He thinks that “[t]he Monica Lewinsky investigation, in particular, with its numerous and
lewd disclosures, led many Europeans to that conclusion.”).
26
See infra Part III.A.
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remains market-dominated, whereas the EU prefers a rightsdominated approach.27
On the basis of multiple differences, several commentators have
noted that the United States and the EU have conflicting data protection standards.28 The type of protection radically changes as data
crosses the Atlantic. The obligations of the users and disseminators
of data, both of which are primarily multinational corporations,
change as well. The recent invalidation of the US–EU Safe Harbor
Agreement,29 which aimed at providing protection for the transfer
of individuals’ personal data from EU member states to organizations in the United States, might have contributed to creating that
perception of conflict.30 The landmark Google Spain decision
handed down by the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”)31 in 2014
certainly reinforced the idea that EU law gives more importance to
data protection than American law,32 although EU law does have a
27
Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in
Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1318 (1999).
28
See, e.g., Leslie E. Minora, U.S. Courts Should Not Let Europe’s “Right to Be
Forgotten” Force the World to Forget, 89 TEMPLE L. REV. 609, 642 (2017) (arguing that
“if and when a U.S. court faces [a right to be forgotten enforcement] decision, it should not
enforce the right to be forgotten because it contravenes our First Amendment”).
29
Commission Decision 2000/520 of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of the Protection Provided
by the Safe Harbour Privacy Principles and Related Frequently Asked Questions Issued by
the U.S. Department of Commerce, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 8.
30
The US–EU Safe Harbor Agreement was heavily criticized in the United States. See
David Raj Nijhawan, The Emperor Has No Clothes: A Critique of Applying the European
Union Approach to Privacy Regulation in the United States, 56 VAND. L. REV. 939, 958
(2003) (arguing that “certification under Safe Harbor . . . face[s] strict constitutional
challenges—for example, under the First Amendment principle of free flow of
information”).
31
Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, 2014
E.C.R. 317.
32
LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST
SPEECH IN AMERICA 7 (1986) (stating that “the free speech idea nonetheless remains one of
our foremost cultural symbols”); Frederick Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, in
ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 175, 176 (Lee C. Bollinger &
Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002) (arguing that “different societies have different
argumentative showstoppers, but in the United States it is often the First Amendment that
serves this function”); Michael L. Rustad & Sanna Kulevska, Reconceptualizing the Right
to Be Forgotten to Enable Transatlantic Data Flow, 28 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 349, 416 (2015)
(highlighting that “the difference in approaches to privacy rights can be attributed to
America’s unilateral protection of the freedoms of expression and the press under the First
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doctrine that echoes the First Amendment right of freedom of expression.33 Many describe the scrutiny levels applied to public disclosure of private facts in the United States and the EU as a “transatlantic clash.”34 Dean Post takes a step further and argues that
Google Spain “forays into the significance of communication on the
Internet.”35 According to another commentator, Professor Byrum,
this situation has the potential of “unearth[ing] a myriad of global
media law issues between the two continents.”36 A senior research
fellow at Heritage Foundation adopts an extreme position and considers the GDPR a form of “imperialism” permitting the EU to aggressively assert jurisdiction over U.S. companies.37

Amendment and Europe’s recognition of the countervailing right to private life in Article
8 of the ECHR”); Howard M. Wasserman, Symbolic Counter-Speech, 12 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 367, 380 (2004) (describing the principle of freedom of speech as an “icon”).
33
Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU reads: “Everyone has the
right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to
receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and
regardless of frontiers.” Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 11(1),
2012 O.J. (C 326/391) 398.
34
Franz Werro, The Right to Inform v. The Right to Be Forgotten: A Transatlantic Clash,
in LIABILITY IN THE THIRD MILLENNIUM 285 (Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi et al. eds., 2009);
see also Andrew Charlesworth, Clash of the Data Titans? US and EU Data Privacy
Regulation, 6 EUR. PUB. L. 253 (2000); Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision:
A Turn to Institutions and Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966, 1976 (2013); Larry
Downes, GDPR and the End of the Internet’s Grand Bargain, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 9,
2018),
https://hbr.org/2018/04/gdpr-and-the-end-of-the-internets-grand-bargain
[https://perma.cc/2CZP-BN7B].
35
See Robert C. Post, Data Privacy and Dignitary Privacy: Google Spain, the Right to
Be Forgotten, and the Construction of the Public Sphere, 67 DUKE L.J. 981, 1071 (2018).
36
KRISTIE BYRUM, THE EUROPEAN RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT
ENEMY xiii (2018); see also Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, ATLANTIC
(July/Aug.
2012),
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/07/the-right-to-beforgotten/309044/ [https://perma. cc/RV4F-8WVC].
37
Theodore Bromund, The U.S. Must Draw a Line on the EU’s Data-Protection
Imperialism, HERITAGE FOUND. (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/governmentregulation/report/the-us-must-draw-line-the-eus-data-protection-imperialism
[https://perma.cc/QEL3-MG25]. However, when it comes to the right to be forgotten, for
instance, which is to be found in Article 17 of the GDPR, in its decision of September 24,
2019, the ECJ highlighted that “where a search engine operator grants a request for dereferencing . . . , that operator is not required to carry out that de-referencing on all versions
of its search engine, but on the versions of that search engine corresponding to all the [EU]
Member States, using, where necessary, measures which, while meeting the legal
requirements, effectively prevent or, at the very least, seriously discourage an internet user
conducting a search from one of the Member States on the basis of a data subject’s name
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The analysis set forth in this Article shows that, despite the different values that American and European cultures attach to privacy,
the United States and EU legal and regulatory regimes define data
privacy in similar ways and impose similar consequences on those
who violate data protections. First, any attempt at comparison between the American and EU systems based upon a generalization
from just one case—as if these systems were monolithic and
standalone—is inaccurate and simplistic. In the EU, even if Google
Spain sets a milestone in the long-standing struggle to find a fair
solution to data protection issues, it is not the only ECJ ruling that
governs digital privacy. Likewise, “privacy” is not a fixed concept
across all American jurisprudence, and American courts have developed a range of robust standards with which to assess different kinds
of data privacy violations.38 Professor Glancy rightly contradicts the
beliefs of some39 when, discussing data privacy law in the United
States, she points out that “it [would be] a mistake to count privacy,
and the laws which protect it, as zero.”40
In parallel with global changes in the ways data is preserved and
protected,41 both the EU legislature and many American state legislatures have gained greater appreciation for the importance of data
protection and have expanded the scope of data regulation. In fact,
several states have already adopted, or are about to adopt, some of
from gaining access, via the list of results displayed following that search, to the links
which are the subject of that request.” See Case C‑507/17, Google LLC v. Commission
nationale de l’informatique et des libertés (CNIL), 2019 E.C.R. 772, ¶ 73 (Sept. 24, 2019).
38
See generally Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PENN. L. REV. 477
(2006).
39
While responding to a question at a product launch Scott McNealy (CEO of Sun
Microsystems) said, “You have zero privacy. Get over it.” See Michael Froomkin, The
Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1463 (2000); Glancy, supra note 22, at 357
(2000) (both Froomkin and Glancy referring to what Scott McNealy said). McNealy’s Sun
Microsystems was a causality of the dot-com bubble.
40
Glancy, supra note 22, at 358.
41
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
“107 countries (of which 66 were developing or transition economies) have put in place
legislation to secure the protection of data and privacy.” Data Protection and Privacy
Legislation Worldwide, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV.,
https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DTL/STI_and_ICTs/ICT4D-Legislation/eCom-DataProtection-Laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/48VL-YEQV]. See also Graham Greenleaf,
Global Data Privacy Laws 2017: 120 National Data Privacy Laws, Including Indonesia
and Turkey, 145 PRIVACY LAWS & BUS. INT’L REP. 10 (2017).
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the protective measures found in the GDPR.42 The CCPA, which
gives consumers, among others, a right to request that a business
delete any personal information that it has collected from its consumers,43 or the legislative proposals recently introduced by a bipartisan group of lawmakers to adopt a strong, national privacy policy
foretell the direction in which the protection of privacy and personal
information is heading in the United States.44
The purpose of this study is neither to find a concept that could
reconcile privacy with freedom of expression nor to provide a
thorough description of data privacy laws in the United States and
the EU. Rather, this study aims to demonstrate, from both practical
and conceptual perspectives, that a multitude of variables influence
any decision regarding a possible loss of privacy or restriction of
freedom of expression. This Article will start by highlighting gaps
in privacy and data protection at various levels, and these gaps’
dramatic consequences for both individuals and businesses in the
computerized world of the 21st century (II). This Article will then
explain the dynamics of current legislative activities in the United
States and the EU with reference to the debate on privacy in general
and data protection in particular. This section of the Article will
introduce the parallels between some factors driving the new
privacy policy in both the United States and the EU, although
the former sees privacy as in essence a civil right and the latter considers it to be a natural right (III).45 This Article will then discuss the

42
Rachel Marmor, Maryam Casbarro & Mike Khoury, “Copycat CCPA” Bills Introduced
in States Across Country, DAVIS WRIGHT & TREMAINE LLP (Feb. 7, 2019)
https://www.dwt.com/insights/2019/02/copycat-ccpa-bills-introduced-in-states-acrosscou [https://perma.cc/4NTC-HWL3].
43
See California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105(a) (2018)
(“A consumer shall have the right to request that a business delete any personal information
about the consumer which the business has collected from the consumer.”).
44
Policy Principles for a Federal Data Privacy Framework in the United States:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 116th Cong. 2
(2019) (statement of Sen. Roger Wicker, Chairman, the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science
and Transportation).
45
Human rights are natural rights usually granted by the Constitution, held against the
powers of the state, whereas civil rights are usually granted by state laws. This distinction
is less important in Europe. For more information on this discussion, see Steven C. Bennett,
The “Right to Be Forgotten:” Reconciling EU and US Perspectives, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L
L. 161, 168 (2012).
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standards and tests that American and European courts respectively
use to evaluate data protection (IV). Finally, this Article will indicate how such in-depth case-based study may be used not only to
facilitate further legal analysis of the sprawling and complex notion
of data protection, but also to show that courts on both sides of the
Atlantic use fundamentally similar criteria to adjudicate data
protection disputes.
I. NECESSITY OF MORE EFFECTIVE MEASURES
This section will discuss the necessity of more effective
measures from the point of view of the protection of privacy in
general and data protection in particular. I will first define what
privacy means today, then focus on the methods that have been used
to remedy privacy breaches or data misuse, and finally highlight
the need, in an evolving technological landscape, for new ways of
legal thinking.
A. Ineffectiveness of Existing Privacy Norms
The U.S. Constitution does not explicitly mention privacy or
data protection, although the U.S. Supreme Court has found that the
Constitution implicitly guarantees a fundamental right to privacy.46
Privacy includes the protection of an individual’s “private space.”47
As Garfinkel described in his book, Database Nation, “privacy [nevertheless] isn’t just about hiding things. It’s about self-possession,
autonomy and integrity”48 or, in the words of the Supreme Court, an
“individual’s control of information concerning his or her person.”49
This description is in line with Warren’s and Brandeis’ original
thinking that the right to privacy was the right of each individual to

46
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (asserting for the first time an
independent constitutional right of privacy, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the
Connecticut birth control statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives by married couples).
47
See Privacy Bridges, supra note 22, at 12.
48
SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY
4–5 (2000).
49
Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763
(1989).
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determine, “ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and
emotions shall be communicated to others.”50
The definition above reflects the traditional American conception of self-reliance, based on Emerson, Thoreau, Dickinson, and
many other nineteenth century American writers.51 Yet it is not very
different form the European conception of privacy. Already in the
seventeenth century, John Locke, one of the most influential European Enlightenment thinkers, had recognized the law of reputation
is a necessary restraint to balance the desire for liberty.52 Locke’s
insight influenced the notion of freedom proclaimed in Article 2
of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen
(“Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen de 1789”), which
implicitly articulates respect for privacy.53 The ECJ’s analytical
approach in Google Spain might be traced back to the
French Revolution.54
Today, both the European Convention on Human Rights55 and
the Charter of Fundamental Rights56 provide similar definitions to
those found in court opinions in the United States. Article 8 of the
Convention and similarly Article 7 of the Charter state that everyone
has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home,
and communications. In Evans, the European Court of Human

50

Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
198 (1890).
51
Dorothy J. Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 25
(1979) [hereinafter Invention].
52
JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, available at
https://www.globalgreyebooks.com/read-online/essay-concerning-human-understanding/
read-online.html#_Toc530974960 [https://perma.cc/6RF4-7K9H] (1690). See also
Michelle E. Brady, Locke’s Thoughts on Reputation, 75 REV. POL. 335 (2013).
53
See Judgment of June 16, 1858, Trib. pr. inst. de la Seine, 1858 D.P. III 62 (Fr.)
(affaire Rachel) (the landmark Rachel decision handed down by the First Instance of Sarine
Court, where the tort of privacy was first recognized in 1858). For the details of this case
see Jeanne M. Hauch, Protecting Private Facts in France: The Warren and Brandeis Tort
Is Alive and Well and Flourishing in Paris, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1219, 1233 (1994).
54
BYRUM, supra note 36, at xiv.
55
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS (June 1, 2010), www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/5MRF-FUFJ] [hereinafter ECHR].
56
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012 O.J. (C 326/393) 391.
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Rights (“ECtHR”) described, on the basis of Article 8 of the Convention, the “protect[tion] against interference with private life [as]
an aspect of the principle of self-determination or personal autonomy.”57 The latter was described in a similar way by the California
Supreme Court as an interest “in making intimate personal decisions
or conducting personal activities without observation, intrusion, or
interference . . . .”58 On both sides of the Atlantic, courts have
adopted a wide-ranging interpretation of “private life.”59
The right to digital self-determination or privacy is the logical
reaction to countless privacy breaches,60 and accordingly this right
has become one of the most discussed and popular topics in the legal
world.61 When Warren and Brandeis published their paper on privacy in 1890, immigration was driving rapid population growth in
the United States, with the result that life in many local communities
was becoming less isolated and the cities were becoming more
crowded.62 In this context, personal privacy became much more difficult to attain or preserve.63 Personal privacy was still in need of
support and protection in 1970, when, under the theory of “captive
audience,” the Supreme Court in Rowan rejected a First Amendment
challenge to a statute enabling people to refuse the Post Office permission to deliver mail from specific senders to their homes.64 To-

57

Evans v. United Kingdom, App. No. 633/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 7 (2007).
Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 654 (Cal. 1994).
59
Michael C. James, A Comparative Analysis of the Right to Privacy in the United
States, Canada and Europe, 29 CONN. J. INT’L L. 257, 276 (2014).
60
On the contemporary conception of privacy, see AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF
PRIVACY 183 (1999). For an overview, see generally M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of
Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131 (2011); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89
YALE L.J. 421 (1980); Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and Law, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 245 (2008); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PENN. L. REV. 477
(2006). On the evolution of the right to privacy, see Invention, supra note 51.
61
Colin J. Bennett, The European General Data Protection Regulation: An Instrument
for the Globalization of Privacy Standards?, 23 INFO. POLITY 239, 239 (2018) (saying that
“[a]t no time in the past 40 years, has the protection of privacy been so prominently,
globally and intensively debated”).
62
OSCAR HANDLIN, IMMIGRATION AS A FACTOR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 1–2 (1959).
63
Edwin L. Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen, SCRIBNER’S MAG., July 1890, at 62.
64
Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) (“We . . . categorically
reject the argument that a vendor has a right under the Constitution or otherwise to send
unwanted material into the home of another . . . . That we are often ‘captives’ outside the
58
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day, the primary threat to individual privacy is the (mis)use of technology that permits private businesses and government agencies to
have access to data about people’s personal lives.
Over the last two decades, millions of Internet users have begun
to surf the web and use commercial online services that cater to their
needs for communication, information, and entertainment.65 Internet
users’ personal information, especially consumer characteristics
such as their earning level, address, and credit card use, is collected,
processed and monetized without the individual’s consent or even
knowledge.66 Many providers of online services record users’ search
history, browsing habits, shopping preferences, geolocation data,67
health and genetic profiles, and even information about their feelings.68 Indeed, Google confirms this practice in its privacy policy:
“We collect information to provide better services to all of our users—from figuring out basic stuff like which language you speak, to
more complex things like which ads you’ll find most useful, the people who matter most to you online, or which YouTube videos you
might like.”69

sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech and other sound does not mean
we must be captives everywhere . . . . The asserted right of a mailer, we repeat, stops at the
outer boundary of every person’s domain.”).
65
In 2015 it was estimated that there were over 3 billion Internet users worldwide. See
Privacy Bridges, supra note 22, at 10.
66
CEES J. HAMELINK, THE ETHICS OF CYBERSPACE 12 (2000) (arguing that “information
itself becomes a commodity tradable on a global scale”). For an illustration, see Internet
Advertising Revenue Report, IAB (Apr. 2016), www.iab.com/wp-content/uploads/
2016/04/IAB_Internet_Advertising_Revenue_Report_FY_2015-final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/28TH-TAYA].
67
Geolocation privacy has recently come into question in cases where “connected
vehicles affect personal information privacy interests, primarily through misuse of personal
data about individual people.” See Dorothy Glancy, Sharing the Road: Smart
Transportation Infrastructure, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1617, 1657–58 (2014) (highlighting
that “a connected vehicle seems likely to be considered comparable to a cell phone”).
68
Roberto Alberdeston, Erich Dondyk & Cliff C. Zou, Click-Tracking Blocker: Privacy
Preservation by Disabling Search Engines’ Click-Tracking, U. CENT. FLA. 2 (2014),
www.cs.ucf.edu/~czou/research/clickTrackBlocker-globecom14.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
336H-6ZGT].
69
See Privacy Policy, GOOGLE, www.google.com/policies/privacy [https://perma.cc/
QL46-FZEB].

2019] TOWARDS A TRANSATLANTIC CONCEPT OF DATA PRIVACY

155

On the other hand, the validity of the consents obtained by multipage end-user license agreements is questionable. It is hardly conceivable that silence, pre-ticked boxes, or inactivity could constitute
valid consent.70 On January 21, 2019, the Commission Nationale de
l’Informatique et des Libertés (“CNIL”), France’s data watchdog,
imposed a record €50 million fine (approximately $55 million) on
Google for having failed to implement adequate measures to meet
the requirements of the GDPR.71 The Commission ruled that Google
did not provide enough information to users about its data consent
policies and did not give them enough control over the way their
information is used.72
According to surveys, people who experience such threats to
their privacy develop a higher awareness of the value of their personal information.73 Privacy matters to society at large because it
contributes to the “building and maintaining of relationships and the
support of a more just, democratic, and tolerant society.”74 According to an interdisciplinary study, privacy includes protection from
the overreach of social interaction; afﬁrmation of self-ownership,

70

GDPR, supra note 17, recital 32 (“Consent should be given by a clear affirmative act
establishing a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data
subject’s agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her . . . . Silence,
pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not therefore constitute consent.”). In this vein, see
also the recent decision handed down by the ECJ on October 1, 2019 in Case C-673/17,
Planet49 GmbH v. Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und Verbraucherverbände—
Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband e.V. 2019 E.C.R. 801, ¶¶ 49, 65 (Oct. 1, 2019)
(holding that the consent which a website user must give to the storage of and access to
cookies on his or her equipment is not validly constituted by way of a pre-checked
checkbox. Thus, the user must actively submit her or his approval for cookie storage).
71
See Deliberation of the Restricted Committee SAN–2019–001 of 21 January 2019
Pronouncing a Financial Sanction Against Google LLC, CNIL 3 (2019),
https://www.cnil.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/san-2019-001.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7USD-DVTS].
72
Id. at 15–24.
73
A recent survey indicates that eight out of ten Americans have concerns about the
privacy of their financial and personal records. See Nearly Half of Americans Say ID Theft
Likely to Cause Them Financial Loss in the Next Year: AICPA Survey, ASS’N INT’L
CERTIFIED PUB. ACCT. (Apr. 3, 2018), www.aicpa.org/press/pressreleases/2018/nearlyhalf-of-americans-say-id-theft-likely-to-cause-them-finan.html [https://perma.cc/JPE8YTRP].
74
Trina J. Magi, Fourteen Reasons Privacy Matters: A Multidisciplinary Review of
Scholarly Literature, 81 LIBR. Q. 187, 206 (2011).
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moral agency, and freedom of choice; prevention against the victimization of people through categorization and being misjudged out of
context; and the possibility for an individual to make a fresh start.75
A “fresh start” is nevertheless getting more and more difficult.
Through data matching, data mining, and de-anonymization, technology leads to the creation of potentially massive “digital dossiers.”
The problem is that most people lack the legal tools allowing them
to monitor and protect their personal information, or to cost-effectively redress the privacy breaches when they occur.76 The usual minor efforts people make to defend their privacy online are often unsuccessful or rather effortlessly by-passed.77 Given these developments, fairness seems more clearly than ever to dictate against placing the burden of privacy protection solely on the data subject.
In April 2015, a 31-year-old woman from Naples, Italy used
WhatsApp to send a series of sex videos to five people, including
her boyfriend.78 In these videos she can be seen, in a drunken state,
performing sex acts with various unidentified men. The videos were
soon shared and uploaded onto several adult websites. However, this
woman was subjected to more than voyeurism. She unwillingly
became a notorious figure as her picture appeared on t-shirts, as
websites parodied her, and as she was called shameful names. She
decided to put up a fight. After unsuccessfully struggling for months
to have the videos removed from the Internet, she went to court,
arguing that the videos had been uploaded onto public websites
without her consent.79 By that time, she was no longer able to live a
75

Id.
Rodney A. Smolla, Privacy and the First Amendment Right to Gather News, 67 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1097, 1100 (1999) (highlighting that “these may be the worst of times for
privacy, in that there appears to be so little of it. Yet these may also be the best of times,
because the collective sense that privacy is being lost appears to be generating a cultural
backlash”).
77
J.J. Sylvia IV, Little Brother: How Big Data Necessitates an Ethical Shift from
Privacy to Power, in CONTROVERSIES IN DIGITAL ETHICS 13, 26 (Amber Davisson & Paul
Booth eds., 2016) (pointing out that “big data-driven decision-making is able to sway easily
the population at large without their having realized it”); Roger Clarke, Internet Privacy
Concerns Confirm the Case for Intervention, 42 COMM. ACM 60 (1999).
78 James Reynolds, Italy’s Tiziana: Tragedy of a Woman Destroyed by Viral Sex Videos,
BBC (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38848528
[https://perma.cc/FJ5Y-8QYL].
79 Id.; see also Tribunal of Naples (Nord), November 3, 2016, in Diritto dell’Informazione
76
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normal life. On September 7, 2016, a Neapolitan court ordered
the sex videos to be removed from various websites and search
engines.80 However, the court also ordered her to pay €20,000
($22,700) in legal costs, which was all too much for her, especially
as she had only a modest income.81 Here are the words of her mother
who, on September 13, 2016, had gone to work at the local town hall
while her daughter stayed home: “My sister-in-law called me, and
in a calm voice told me to come home; when I got here I saw the
police, the ambulance, and I quickly understood. My sister-in-law
tried to pick her up and save her. My neighbors didn’t allow me to
get out of my car. I almost fainted. They didn’t want to let me into
this house. I wasn’t even able to see her for a last time. The day she
died, my life ended.”82
This happened in Europe, but such tragic events where the
ongoing public availability of accurate information about an identifiable person leads to significant injustice without sufficient
countervailing public benefits are happening everywhere, and
often at mass level, with increasing regularity. The 2014 hacking of
the online accounts of several celebrities, including Oscar winner
Jennifer Lawrence, leading to the posting of their nude photographs
online, is one of the numerous examples that happened in the
United States.83
Although those are not without criticisms or reservations,84
many methods have been used in the United States to remedy

e dell’Informatica 243 (2017) (commented by Matteo Montanari).
80
Reynolds, supra note 78. Before the final decision, the court ordered the websites to
remove the videos on September 7, 2016. Id.
81
Id.
82
For more information on this case, see UMBERTO AMBROSOLI & MASSIMO SIDERI,
DIRITTO ALL’OBLIO, DOVERE DELLA MEMORIA 1 (2017).
83
Ellie Davis, Jennifer Lawrence on Dealing with Her Nude Photo Leak, VOGUE
(Nov. 21, 2017), www.vogue.co.uk/article/jennifer-lawrence-apple-hack-nude-images
[https://perma.cc/2JBH-3NX9].
84
For criticisms or reservations see, e.g., William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV.
383, 400–01 (1960) (arguing that “the privacy cases do go considerably beyond the narrow
limits of defamation, and no doubt have succeeded in affording a needed remedy in a good
many instances not covered by the other tort.” He concludes that “it is here, however, that
one disposed to alarm might express the greatest concern over where privacy may be
going”).
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privacy breaches or data misuse85 since Warren and Brandeis drew
attention in 1890 to the necessity to set up protection against
invasion of privacy. They argued that “inventions and business
methods call attention to the next step which must be taken for the
protection of the person, and for securing to the individual . . . the
right ‘to be let alone.’”86
Today, individual privacy is governed by constitutional provisions, federal and state statutes, regulations, and voluntary industry
guidelines of practice that apply to the public and private sectors in
different ways.87 Plaintiffs seeking to vindicate privacy rights
through litigation can select their causes of action from a range of
tort claims.88 Defamation creates a cause of action to protect one’s
reputation from false claims.89 Intrusion upon seclusion creates a
cause of action to protect one from the intentional invasion into a
person’s solitude or private area through, for instance, “eavesdropping, peeping through windows or surreptitiously opening another’s
mail.”90 Public disclosure of private facts is a cause of action against
one that disseminates generally unknown private information, even
if it is true.91 A plaintiff may sue for misappropriation, which is
using another’s name, likeness, or other personal attributes without
permission for exploitative purposes.92 In some states, a plaintiff can
bring a claim for false light if a defendant publishes information that
places the subject in a highly offensive light.93 As Professor
Schwartz noted, “in a defamation action, the plaintiff complains that

85

Solove, supra note 60, at 77; Ieuan Jolly, Data Protection in the United States:
Overview, PRAC. L., http://us.practicallaw.com/6-5020467 [https://perma.cc/3NLZUPV7].
86
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 50, at 195.
87
Domingo R. Tan, Personal Privacy in the Information Age: Comparison of Internet
Data Protection Regulations in the United States and the European Union, 21 LOY. L.A.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 661, 668 (1999).
88
Joseph A. Page, American Tort Law and the Right to Privacy, in PERSONALITY RIGHTS
IN EUROPEAN TORT LAW 38 (Gert Brüggemeier, Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi & Patrick
O’Callaghan eds., 2010).
89
3 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 23:6 (2019).
90
Id. § 24:6.
91
Id. § 24:5.
92
Id. § 24:4.
93
Id. § 24:3.
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the defendant’s statement has diminished his reputation; the statement’s falsity comes in by showing that this diminution is not justified. In a false light action, the defendant’s falsehood brings about a
mismatch or conflict between the plaintiff’s actual identity and his
identity in the minds of others, a conflict that itself can be offensive
or disorienting.”94
Intellectual property laws provide another mechanism to
regulate information flows, and to mediate, problematize, or resolve
tensions that may arise between freedom of speech and privacy. To
take the fight against revenge porn in the United States as an
example, copyright law can favor either the perpetrator or the
victim, depending on the facts.95 Copyright law compounds the
violation of the victim’s privacy if the perpetrator has photographed
or filmed the images and therefore owns the right to distribute and
reproduce them.96 On the other hand, copyright law equips the
victim with a powerful tool to fight back against the perpetrator if,
as is often the case, the victim was the one who recorded the images
and thus owns the distribution and reproduction rights.97
In the EU, too, there are several ways to resolve the inherent
conflict between copyright and freedom of expression.98 The ECJ
has recently been questioned by the German Supreme Court as to
whether, in the absence of an applicable copyright exception,
fundamental rights like freedom of expression and freedom of information should permit the disclosure or unauthorized use of military
reports that have been distributed to selected members of the Parliament as “classified documents.”99 In its decision handed down on
94
Gary T. Schwartz, Explaining and Justifying a Limited Tort of False Light Invasion
of Privacy, 41 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 885, 898 (1991).
95
17 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
96
See Danielle Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 345, 360 (2014).
97
Amanda Levendowski, Using Copyright to Combat Revenge Porn, 3 N.Y.U. J.
INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 422, 439 (2014).
98
See Jonathan Griffiths, European Union Copyright Law and the Charter of
Fundamental Rights—Advocate General Szpunar’s Opinions in (C-469/17) Funke Medien,
(C-476/17) Pelham GmbH and (C-516/17) Spiegel Online, 20 ERA F. 35, 38 (2019).
99 Case C-469/17, Funke Medien NRW GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2018
E.C.R. 870, available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=207024&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid
=1948409 [https://perma.cc/K4E4-UVVA]. On the facts and the opinion of Advocate
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July 29, 2019, the ECJ ruled that “freedom of information and freedom of the press, enshrined in Article 11 of the [EU] Charter, are
not capable of justifying, beyond the exceptions or limitations
provided for in [the European Copyright Directive], a derogation
from the author’s exclusive rights of reproduction and of communication to the public.”100 Thus, just as in the United States, neither
freedom of expression nor freedom of the press constitutes an
autonomous ground to override the exclusive rights of a copyright
holder, unless an exception or a limitation listed in the Copyright
Directive is applicable.101
On the other hand, reflecting the high value placed on freedom
of speech in American and European cultures, courts in both jurisdictions have restricted privacy torts in order to protect that freedom.102 Thus, even though privacy torts can be invoked to deal with
the publication of false or unknown information, they do not offer
an adequate mechanism to protect true personal information from
unwanted dissemination.103 Furthermore, while copyright protects
content created by the subject, it does not include non-creative uses
of the work.104
None of the torts or protective mechanisms discussed above
address in a coherent way the issue of the unconsented publication
of true personal information. There are three main reasons for this.
First, most privacy violation cases are based solely on hypothetical
future harm and, in the absence of sufficient evidence proving direct

General see Stijn van Deursen & Thom Snijders, The Court of Justice at the Crossroads:
Clarifying the Role for Fundamental Rights in the EU Copyright Framework, 49 INT’L
REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMP. L. 1080 (2018) (highlighting the differences between the
approaches taken by the ECJ and the ECtHR on that matter).
100
See Case C-469/17, at ¶ 64.
101
Council Directive 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April
2019 on Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Single Market and amending
Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC, 2019 O.J. (L 130).
102
Quin Landon, The First Amendment and Speech-Based Torts: Recalibrating the
Balance, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 157, 165 (2011).
103
Paul A. Freund, Privacy: One Concept or Many, in PRIVACY & PERSONALITY 188, 188
(Ronald Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971).
104
For more information and the recent developments, see R. Anthony Reese,
Copyrightable Subject Matter in the “Next Great Copyright Act, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1489 (2015).
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or actual harm, courts tend to dismiss data breach claims.105 Second,
the disclosure or use of information on the Internet is often covered
by the website’s terms of use. Even though those are seldom read
and even less often understood, Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act immunizes websites for the content published on their
sites: “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided
by another information content provider.”106 Third, privacy
breaches do not end with the intrusion. Often subsequent republication on the Internet by third parties causes more harm than the original breach.107 Nevertheless, since in most instances the First
Amendment protects the right to discuss and report on matters of
public interest, the latter protects most republishers.108
Needless to say, the Constitutional Convention could not have
foreseen the evolution in communication technology when it ratified
the First Amendment in 1791.109 However, as Justice Sotomayor has
highlighted, “[T]he premise that an individual has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third
parties . . . is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a
great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the
course of carrying out mundane tasks.”110 The U.S. Supreme Court
Justice’s concern became more pronounced with the growing use of
social media tools, live-streaming video, and direct messaging.
105

Khan v. Children’s Nat’l Health Sys., 188 F. Supp. 3d 524, 534 (D. Md. 2016).
47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018).
107
Mills and Harclerode illustrate the impact of republication with a stunning example:
“In 2016, a group of Russian hackers used a spear phishing attack to breach the email
account of John Podesta, the chairman of Hillary Clinton’s 2016 presidential campaign.
This initial intrusion, the original publication of the emails on Wikileaks, and the
subsequent republication of the emails on almost every news site imaginable played a
substantial—but largely immeasurable—role in Donald Trump’s defeat of Hillary Clinton
in November 2016.” Jon L. Mills & Kelsey Harclerode, Privacy, Mass Intrusion and the
Modern Data Breach, 69 FLA. L. REV. 771, 776–77 (2018).
108
But see The Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 700 (protecting a person who has filed for
bankruptcy by prohibiting public and private actors to hurt that person’s future as a result
of the divulgation of the information); The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681
(2012) (protecting individuals from the willful and/or negligent inclusion of inaccurate
information in their credit report and to prevent unwarranted invasion of privacy).
109
On the evolution of First Amendment doctrine, see Thomas W. Joo, The Worst Test
of Truth: The “Marketplace of Ideas” as Faulty Metaphor, 89 TULANE L. REV. 383 (2014).
110
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
106
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Social media serves, at first sight, similar functions of informing
and entertaining as traditional media.111 Indeed, just having access
to a computer makes it possible to record and publish images,
experiences, ideas, and emotions, and reach millions of people at the
same speed as television, although not always with the depth of a
newspaper or magazine.112 In the legal context, the creation of such
a “sociological archive” raises difficult normative problems regarding the interpretation of matters of public concern and the limits of
self-determination. Can the loss of self-determination itself be
deemed sufficient evidence of the harm suffered by the plaintiff
in a breach of privacy case? To what extent does the First Amendment apply to social media content or Internet search engines?113
Can a right to know be sustained as a matter of constitutional principle?114 Can all active Internet users and social media enthusiasts
be considered as their own “press” in terms of the First Amendment?
If the question is answered in the negative, what kind of content
deserves the application of the special press privileges? If the question is answered in the affirmative, does the protection offered by
the First Amendment not swallow the right to privacy?
111

An author defines social media as “the many relatively inexpensive and widely
accessible electronic tools that enable anyone to publish and access information,
collaborate on a common effort, or build relationships.” DHIRAJ MURTHY, TWITTER: SOCIAL
COMMUNICATION IN THE TWITTER AGE 7 (2013).
112
A leading trust study has revealed that search engines and social media platforms play
a key role in explaining why the media is the least trusted institution. 2018 Edelman Trust
Barometer Reveals Record-Breaking Drop in Trust, EDELMAN (Jan. 22, 2018),
www.edelman.com/news-awards/2018-edelman-trust-barometer-reveals-record-breakingdrop-trust-in-the-us [https://perma.cc/3MQ7-4VS4]. See also Craig Silverman, Lies, Damn
Lies, and Viral Content, TOW CTR. DIGITAL JOURNALISM 146 (Sept. 5, 2017),
https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D8Q81RHH
[https://perma.cc/
MG83-TU6A].
113
Oren Bracha notes that “the claim that First Amendment protection extends to ranking
of search results may appear well founded, at least as a matter of positive law.” Oren
Bracha, The Folklore of Informationalism: The Case of Search Engine Speech, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 1629, 1685 (2014). However, according to the author, “on closer
examination, this certainty disappears, [since] the First Amendment has a vital role to play
in limiting governmental power.” Id. at 1632.
114
See Lillian R. BeVier, An Informed Public, an Informing Press: The Search for a
Constitutional Principle, 68 CAL. L. REV. 517 (1980) (concluding that “the first
amendment does not in principle guarantee that a well-informed citizenry with the press as
its constitutionally appointed information gathering agent are values of affirmative,
independent constitutional significance”).

2019] TOWARDS A TRANSATLANTIC CONCEPT OF DATA PRIVACY

163

In an evolving technological landscape, new ways of legal thinking are needed in order to respond properly to these pressing questions. In another common law jurisdiction, Justice Mann of the High
Court of England and Wales issued an unusual and inspiring decision in the recent Mirror News Paper phone hacking case, Gulati.115
This decision defines loss as the diminution of the plaintiff’s right
to privacy itself and thus considerably broadens the scope of privacy
tort:
Those values (or interests) [i.e., the protection of
the individual's informational autonomy] are not
confined to protection from distress, and it is not in
my view apparent why distress (or some similar emotion), which would admittedly be a likely consequence of an invasion of privacy, should be the only
touchstone for damages. While the law is used to
awarding damages for injured feelings, there is no
reason in principle, in my view, why it should not
also make an award to reflect infringements of the
right itself, if the situation warrants it. The fact that
the loss is not scientifically calculable is no more a
bar to recovering damages for ‘loss of personal
autonomy’ or damage to standing than it is to damages for distress. If one has lost the right to control
the dissemination of information about one’s private
life then I fail to see why that, of itself, should not
attract a degree of compensation, in an appropriate
case. A right has been infringed, and loss of a kind
recognised by the court as wrongful has been caused.
It would seem to me to be contrary to principle not to
recognise that as a potential route to damages.116
While this decision does not solve all the normative problems when
it comes to the limits of self-determination, it does show that a more
liberal approach to privacy is possible. Whether American law or

115

Gulati v. MGN Ltd. [2015] EWHC 1482 (Ch), ¶ 111, available at www.5rb.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/05/MGN-trial-jt-REDACTED.pdf [https://perma.cc/UK5N-HT8J].
116
Id.
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continental European law can provide the grounds upon which to
base such an ingenious and original decision remains to be seen.
B. Gaps in Existing Data Protection Norms
The definitions of privacy and personal data, as well as the scope
of their protections, have been subject to ongoing change as a result
of rapid technological advances (e.g. genomic data) and globalization.117 As exemplified by the recent complaint with the Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”) alleging that Amazon’s Alexa or similar devices violate the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
(“COPPA”) because they collect and process personal data by
recording kids’ voice conversations,118 these ongoing changes make
it difficult to predict the outcome of the cases where data protection
laws could apply. However, the evolution of the right to data
protection has acquired distinctive and essentially stable characteristics that reliably distinguish it, to some extent, from the right to
privacy. Data protection is about securing “personal data,” rather
than providing redress for “injury to [a] plaintiff’s emotions and his
[or her] mental suffering.”119 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (“OECD”) Guidelines on the Protection
of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data defines personal
data as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable
individual (data subject).”120
In the EU, data protection is seen as a specific expression of the
right to privacy,121 and therefore specific rules set forth in the GDPR
117

Magi, supra note 74, at 206 (concluding that “the term ‘privacy’ is difﬁcult to deﬁne
and perhaps best used as an umbrella term to describe a web of related concepts”).
118
Request for Investigation of Amazon, Inc.’s Echo Dot Kids Edition for Violating the
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, FTC (May 9, 2019), https://drive.google.com/
file/d/1RptCGM-88t08xGj3CaxKMMbml7glT1EK/view [https://perma.cc/Q7AE-TEN2].
119
Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the
Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 958 (1989) (defining the purpose of privacy tort
by referring to Froelich v. Adair, 516 P.2d 993, 997 (1973) and Hazlitt v. Fawcett
Publications, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 538, 544 (D. Conn. 1953)).
120
OECD GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF
PERSONAL DATA, art. 1(b) (2013), www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesonthe
protectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm#part1
[https://perma.cc/MD9G-4N2C].
121
Juliane Kokott & Christoph Sobotta, The Distinction Between Privacy and Data
Protection in the Jurisprudence of the CJEU and the ECtHR, 3 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L.
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regulate it.122 In contrast, data privacy regulation in the United States
is currently a kind of “hodgepodge,”123 because it is not underpinned
by a clear, unified right to privacy. Instead of a federal law regulating the way entities across all industries are allowed to collect and
use consumer data, there is a horde of different laws applying to
various issues and sectors of the economy. For example, COPPA
regulates the protection of the privacy of children under the age of
13 in their interactions with online websites. Another example is the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”), which applies to financial institutions and establishes requirements designed to protect consumer
data. Furthermore, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) safeguards the privacy of individually identifiable health information.124
The Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”)125 was one of the first
instances of data protection law passed in the digital age.126 The
FCRA has been amended several times since it was enacted in 1970.
The 2013 amendment empowers consumers to dispute the completeness, accuracy, or fairness of information mentioned in a report and
to request the correction or deletion of negative information found
on a credit report if it is associated with the consumer’s personal
information.127 Even if, at first sight, the scope of application of the

222, 222 (2013) (discussing “the relevant jurisprudence of Europe’s two highest courts, the
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg . . . and the CJEU, with regard to the
differences between privacy and data protection”).
122
Bart van der Sloot, Legal Fundamentalism: Is Data Protection Really a Fundamental
Right?, in DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY: (IN)VISIBILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE 3
(Ronald Leenes et al. eds., 2017).
123
Glancy, supra note 22, at 359.
124
See United States v. Bormes, 568 U.S. 6 (2012); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. V.
Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 622 (2012); Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 550 U.S. 1 (2007).
125
15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (2018).
126
On various occasions the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld and enforced this Act. See
Bormes, 568 U.S. at 613; Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011); Safeco Ins. Co.
of Am. V. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007). Recent constitutional challenges to the FCRA have
been rejected. See King v. Gen. Info. Servs., Inc., 903 F. Supp. 2d 303 (E.D. Pa. 2012); see
also, Memorandum of the United States of America in Support of the Constitutionality of
§ 1681c of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, King v. Gen. Info. Servs., Inc., 903 F. Supp. 2d
303 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (No. 2:10-cv-06850-PBT), available at www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/amicus_briefs/shamara-t.king-v.general-information-services-inc./
120508fcraking-gis.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NJW-XP5T].
127
15 U.S.C. § 1681(i)(a)(5)(A) (2012).
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FCRA seems narrower than that of the GDPR, the protection it offers is actually very similar, as it grants American citizens a right
similar to the right to erase conferred to EU citizens following
Google Spain, provided that search engines can be classified as
credit reporting agencies.128
Nevertheless, many types of data collection, such as databases
used to target sales and marketing efforts and airline reservation
data, fall outside the scope of these federal statutes.129 In the United
States, the FTC Act, which established the FTC and is the most
wide-ranging federal data privacy regulation, partially fills the
gap.130 Indeed, the FTC is the primary regulatory body for data protection, even though it was not created for this specific purpose.131
On the basis of Section 45 of the Act, the FTC regulates “[u]fair
methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”132 Within this
framework, a misleading representation, practice, or omission will

128

And they might well be, since, besides collecting information a user actively gives
when typing a search query, search engines also gather information through the use of
cookies or similar technologies. See generally Mark T. Andrus, Constitutional Issues in
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and Encouraging the Adoption of Best Practices, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 809, 814 (2011).
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15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006). See generally Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914,
Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2006))
(FTC’s primary goal was to “prevent persons, partnerships, or Corporations . . . from using
unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce.”). See generally Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, Pub.
L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2006) and 29
U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2006)) (stating that one of the primary goals of the FTC was to prevent
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be deemed “deceptive” and thus give rise to liability if it is “material,” when viewed from the perspective of a reasonably acting
consumer,133 and a consumer acting in reasonable reliance on the
material representation, practice, or omission would foreseeably
suffer injury, loss, or harm in consequence of that reliance.134 Thus,
the FTC’s authority to regulate consumer data protection in all
industries not specifically targeted by federal law is based upon data
subjects’ deception.
Under Section 45, the FTC is able to sue companies that use
deceptive practices. It can do so either on its own or upon referrals,
from either EU data protection authorities or third-party private dispute resolution providers. Some critics argue that this system is slow
and complicated and does not help consumers.135 Moreover,
although the FTC has obtained numerous settlements, including in
some of the largest data breach lawsuits, the phrase “unfair or
deceptive” clearly limits its authority. Federal courts have recently
cast doubt on the FTC’s right to deal with personal data breaches. In
LabMD, for instance, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
ruled that “the [FTC’s] complaint alleges no specific unfair acts or
practices engaged in by LabMD.”136
Examples of personal data breaches are multiple, but the recent
cases of Equifax, Facebook, and Ashley Madison are the most
striking ones in the United States. Equifax, one of the nation’s
largest credit reporting companies, has recently revealed a massive
data breach that affected more than 148 million Americans.137 In its
statements made in 2017 and 2018, the company reported that the
names and dates of birth of approximately 146.6 million people
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John D. Dingell, Chairman, House Comm. on Energy Commerce 1 (Oct. 14, 1983),
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Fed. Trade Comm’n v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 883 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2018).
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were exposed, as well as 145.5 million Social Security numbers, the
address information for 99 million people, the gender data for 27.3
million people, 20.3 million consumers’ phone numbers, 17.6
million driver’s license numbers, 1.8 million email addresses,
209,000 credit card numbers and expiration dates, and 97,500 tax
ID numbers.138
In another data privacy scandal in March 2018, Facebook
declared that the personal data of 87 million users worldwide had
been collected through an app from November 2013 to May 2015
and transferred to Cambridge Analytica, a political consulting
firm.139 Millions of users’ data was accessed and exploited, without
the data subjects’ consent, to create politically useful profiling and
micro-target citizens, giving campaign groups the ability to connect
with individual voters.140
Another example is the Ashley Madison data breach.141 In
July 2015, an anonymous hacker group calling itself the Impact
Team hacked into Ashley Madison, an online cheating website and
threatened to publish the stolen information unless Ashley Madison
was permanently shut down.142 The parent company, Avid Life
Media, refused and, as a result, the hackers uploaded about thirty
gigabytes of stolen data on the dark web. This data included the personal information of the site’s users—data the website had promised
not to keep—as well as information about the company, such as
financial data, and employee salary information. The users whose
data was published have faced several problems during the litigation
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process, including an order issued by the federal district judge appointed to lead the multidistrict litigation to publicly disclose the
class representatives’ names.143
The number of persons affected by the cases mentioned above
and the procedural difficulties they encountered in remedying
the damage caused by the alleged data breaches can serve as an
illustration of the burdens that the current legal system imposes on
an individual seeking to redress the misuse of personal information
in a timely and satisfactory manner.144 On the one hand, as Chief
Justice John Roberts pointed out in Riley, “the fact that technology
now allows an individual to carry such information in his hand
does not make the information any less worthy of the protection for
which the Founders fought.”145 On the other hand, both the hacked
businesses and the individual victims are under the impression that
the judicial system should be adaptable to technological developments.146 As hackers are most often located outside the country’s
jurisdiction, identifying who is liable is a difficult task.147 The
victims’ frustration rises even further due to their inability to prevent
bloggers, the media and others from copying, republishing, or
commenting on the stolen data. This is, so to speak, part of most
hackers’ plans: republication of the data after the hack to harm their
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target. Freedom of expression and freedom of the press protect the
republication of hacked data, leaving a data subject very little
opportunity to seek relief once the media have gotten a hold of stolen
data.148 However, the fact that technology now allows data to be dispersed across many operational systems and disseminated over wide
geographical distances should not make data any less worthy of the
protection.149 Indeed, as many as 88% of Americans would support
the adoption of the so-called “right to erasure of personal data.”150
II. LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE CHALLENGES TO DATA
PRIVACY

Recent legislative efforts at the state and federal levels in the
United States indicate that Americans are as concerned about data
privacy as are Europeans, even though the latter have implemented
more laws on that subject.151
A. Recent Developments Following the CCPA
The tendency to reinforce data privacy protection on the basis of
new rules instead of relying on the existing ones have become more
noticeable in the EU than in the United States, particularly with the
adoption of the GDPR.152 However, privacy protection and data security, which include the right to erase, are not only on the EU
agenda. It seems that the developments in data privacy protection in
the EU have been used to ratchet up standards in the United States.
In May 2014, reporting serious concerns about the privacy
implications of “people search” services that permit access to large
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amounts of an individual’s personal information based solely on
a search of that individual’s name, the FTC recommended to the
Congress a broader privacy protection.153 The FTC advocated for
legislation that would require data brokers to154:
(1) allow consumers to access their own information;
(2) allow consumers to opt out of the use of the information;
(3) clearly disclose to consumers the data brokers’
sources of information, so that, if possible, the consumer can correct his or her information at the
source; and
(4) clearly disclose any limitations of the opt out,
such as the fact that close matches of an individual’s
name may continue to appear in search results.155
The FTC’s recommendation highlights the fact that current
American privacy law does not efficiently address the issue of data
protection. The general public shares this point of view. A 2017
Harris poll of more than one thousand Americans found that eight
in ten adults are concerned about the ability of businesses to safeguard their financial and personal information.156 The 2017 Norton
Cyber Security Insights Report revealed the cost of data security
failures in financial terms: cybercrime cost American consumers
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FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY 54 (2014), www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokerscall-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/CYT4-8ZER].
154
According to the OECD, “data brokers are firms that gather and merge aggregated
information on individuals that is then sold for various uses such as employment
background checks, the issuing of credit and for law enforcement purposes.” See Exploring
the Economics of Personal Data: A Survey of Methodologies for Measuring Monetary
Value, OECD (Apr. 2, 2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k486qtxldmq-en [https://perma.
cc/56BB-F8Y7].
155
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 153, at ix.
156
AICPA, supra note 73. This survey was conducted by The Harris Poll by telephone
within the United States between October 12 and 15, 2017, among 1,006 adults. Figures
for age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, region and household income were weighted (using
data from the Current Population Survey) where necessary to bring them into line with
their actual proportions in the population.
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$19.4 billion of their own money in 2017.157 This high cost
importantly shows that American businesses taken as a whole have
failed to implement the principles known collectively as “Privacy
by Design.”158 These principles reflect the idea that privacy
measures and privacy enhancing technologies should be embedded
directly into the design of information technologies and systems,
providing a proactive rather than a reactive approach.159
In order to respond to this concern, some state lawmakers in the
United States enacted several measures taking European data protection concept as a model. That is why, before turning to the recent
developments in the United States, it is necessary to mention briefly
the process of the adoption of the GDPR, which makes Privacy
by Design a mandatory provision for businesses.160 The effort to
enact a new data protection law in the EU goes back to November
2010 when, after years of reflection, consultation, and debates, the
Vice-President of the European Commission and EU Justice Commissioner, Viviane Reding, announced a reform designed to make
Europe the standard setter for modern data protection rules in the
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2017 Norton Cyber Security Insights Report, SYMANTEC (2018),
www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/about/2017-ncsir-global-comparisonunited-states-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/5AFZ-B8QZ].
158
For other reasons companies increasingly felt unwilling to follow self-regulatory
privacy standards, see Justin Brookman, Protecting Privacy in an Era of Weakening
Regulation, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 355, 362–64 (2015).
159
For more information on Privacy-by-Design, see Ann Cavoukian & Jeff Jonas,
Privacy by Design in the Age of Big Data, PRIVACY BY DESIGN (June 8, 2012),
https://jeffjonas.typepad.com/Privacy-by-Design-in-the-Era-of-Big-Data.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E9AW-VM6C]; JEROEN VAN REST ET AL., DESIGNING PRIVACY-BYDESIGN, ANNUAL PRIVACY FORUM 2012: PRIVACY TECHNOLOGIES AND POLICY 55 (2012).
160
See GDPR, supra note 17, art. 25 (“Taking into account the state of the art, the cost
of implementation and the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing . . . , the
controller shall, both at the time of the determination of the means for processing and at
the time of the processing itself, implement appropriate technical and organizational
measures . . . to protect the rights of data subjects. The controller shall implement
appropriate technical and organizational measures for ensuring that, by default, only
personal data which are necessary for each specific purpose of the processing are
processed. That obligation applies to the amount of personal data collected, the extent of
their processing, the period of their storage and their accessibility. In particular, such
measures shall ensure that by default personal data are not made accessible without the
individual’s intervention to an indefinite number of natural persons.”).
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digital age.161 In January 2012, the European Commission revealed
its proposal to adopt more concrete remedies, as well as its proposal
to create a far-reaching new privacy right—the “right to erase.”162
If certain conditions regarding the data are met,163 a data subject may
exercise the right to erase and thereby place an obligation on the data
controller to check the conditions for erasure of the specified personal data “without undue delay.”164 In 2014, the ECJ held for the
first time that EU citizens have a right to erase.165 Over the last few
years, Reding’s speech and this decision constraining Google’s public disclosure of private facts have widely been debated.166 The right
to erase was then codified in Article 17(2) of the GDPR, which
creates a stronger and more cohesive data protection law than the
1995 Data Protection Directive.167 The GDPR entered into force on

161

Viviane Reding, Vice-President of the European Comm’n, Privacy Matters—Why
The EU Needs New Personal Data Protection Rules, Speech at the European Data
Protection and Privacy Conference (Nov. 20, 2010), europa.eu/rapid/press-release
_SPEECH-10-700_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/SXW4-AEMS]. It is worth noting that at that
time, several European countries developed laws protecting privacy rights and
implemented the concept of a right to be forgotten into their national privacy policy.
See, e.g., BVerfGE 65, 1 BvR 209/83, Dec. 15, 1983, https://www.bundesverfassungs
gericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/1983/12/rs19831215_1bvr020983.html
[https://perma.cc/5CQT-N9YC] (judgment of the German Constitutional Court ruling that
individuals are entitled to determine which information about themselves is known to
others). For more information on this topic, see Gloria González Fuster, The Surfacing of
National Norms on Data Processing in Europe, 74 Cambridge L.J. 245–47 (2014).
162
Commission Proposal for a Regulation on the Protection of Individuals with Regard
to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data
Protection Regulation), COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012).
163
GDPR, supra note 17, art. 17.1.
164
Id. The timescale of appropriate delay is “about a month.” See Everything You Need
to Know About the “Right to Be Forgotten,” GDPR.EU, https://gdpr.eu/right-to-beforgotten/ [https://perma.cc/LSF5-WNAN].
165
Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, 2014
E.C.R. 717.
166
For comments on Reding’s speech, see ORLA LYNSKEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EU
DATA PROTECTION LAW 4, 232 (2015); Alexandra Rengel, PRIVACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY
146 (2013); Rosen, supra note 36. On Google Spain, see generally Edward Lee,
Recognizing Rights in Real Time: The Role of Google in the EU Right to Be Forgotten, 49
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1017 (2016); Post, supra note 35; Julia Powles, The Case That Won’t
Be Forgotten, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 583 (2015).
167
See generally Francoise Gilbert, The Right to Erasure or Right to Be Forgotten: What
the Recent Law, Cases, and Guidelines Mean for Global Companies, 18 J. INTERNET L. 13
(2015).
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May 25, 2018 and replaced the Directive,168 which had not fully
harmonized national privacy laws within Europe.169
The legislative efforts in the EU are not limited to the adoption
of the GDPR. To replace the 2002 e-Privacy Directive, on January
10, 2017, the European Commission issued a proposal for a Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications designed to
update current rules to reflect technological developments, and to
adapt the rules to fit within the GDPR’s regulatory framework.170
This proposal aims at strengthening the rules on the protection of
electronic communications data, for example by requiring that
browser settings should disable cookies by default.171 Such a configuration would allow Internet users to prevent other parties from

168

See generally GDPR, supra note 17.
Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Bart van der Sloot & Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, The
European Union General Data Protection Regulation: What It Is and What It Means, 28
INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 65, 71 (2019).
170
Commission Proposal for a Regulation Concerning the Respect for Private Life and
the Protection of Personal Data in Electronic Communications and Repealing Directive
2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications), COM (2017) 10
final (Jan. 10, 2017).
171
See id. recital 24 (“For web browsers to be able to obtain end-users’ consent as defined
under Regulation (EU) 2016/679, for example, to the storage of third party tracking
cookies, they should, among others [sic], require a clear affirmative action from the enduser of terminal equipment to signify his or her freely given, specific informed, and
unambiguous agreement to the storage and access of such cookies in and from the terminal
equipment. Such action may be considered to be affirmative, for example, if end-users are
required to actively select ‘accept third party cookies’ to confirm their agreement and are
given the necessary information to make the choice. To this end, it is necessary to require
providers of software enabling access to internet that, at the moment of installation, endusers are informed about the possibility to choose the privacy settings among the various
options and ask them to make a choice. Information provided should not dissuade endusers from selecting higher privacy settings and should include relevant information about
the risks associated to allowing third party cookies to be stored in the computer, including
the compilation of long-term records of individuals’ browsing histories and the use of such
records to send targeted advertising. Web browsers are encouraged to provide easy ways
for end-users to change the privacy settings at any time during use and to allow the user to
make exceptions for or to whitelist certain websites or to specify for which websites (third)
party cookies are always or never allowed.”). In this vein see also id. art. 10 (“Information
and Options for Privacy Settings to Be Provided: 1. Software placed on the market
permitting electronic communications, including the retrieval and presentation of
information on the internet, shall offer the option to prevent third parties from storing
information on the terminal equipment of an end-user or processing information already
stored on that equipment. 2. Upon installation, the software shall inform the end-user about
169
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storing or processing their information without consent. This
browser default setting would harmonize well with the Privacy
by Design approach implemented in the GDPR, which makes
preservation of privacy a central part of the architecture of Internet
products and services. Moreover, the Amendments also extend from
six months to twelve months the periodic intervals at which users
are given the opportunity to withdraw or confirm their consent
regarding the use of their information. Finally, both the European
Parliament and the Council agreed on the necessity to implement by
default “Do-Not-Track” mechanisms in browser settings. Such
mechanisms enable users to signal content providers their preference towards behavioral advertising.172 In line with the GDPR, the
Proposal expressly stated that a valid “opt-in” consent must be
obtained from the user in order to send unsolicited electronic communications such as e-mails, push notifications, or SMS.173
These recent developments in data privacy outside American
borders have already influenced, to some extent, the data protection
policies of online companies such as eBay or Amazon, social media
platforms like Twitter, and search engines such as Google.174 The

the privacy settings options and, to continue with the installation, require the end-user to
consent to a setting.”).
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Martin Degeling et al., We Value Your Privacy . . . Now Take Some Cookies:
Measuring the GDPR’s Impact on Web Privacy, NETWORK & DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS
SECURITY (NDSS) SYMP. 2019 1, 3 (2019), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1808.05096.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3ALY-YKSY].
173
As mentioned on the official website of the EU, in case of electronic marketing to
existing customers regarding the company’s own similar products or services, such a
consent is not required, on condition that, for each marketing communication, customers
have the opportunity to withdraw their consent. This withdrawal right must be available
free of charge. See generally Data Protection and Online Privacy, YOUR EUROPE:
EUROPEAN UNION (June 14, 2019), https://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/
internet-telecoms/data-protection-online-privacy/index_en.htm [https://perma.cc/452LQJP7].
174
See Ebay’s Commitment to GDPR, EBAY, https://www.ebayinc.com/company/
privacy-center/gdpr/ [https://perma.cc/6P4X-PAAK]; General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR), AMAZON WEB SERVICES, https://aws.amazon.com/compliance/gdpr-center/
[https://perma.cc/Y6UM-87Y7]; What is Twitter’s Approach to the GDPR?, TWITTER,
https://gdpr.twitter.com/en/faq.html [https://perma.cc/EF7Y-T3PN]; Our Commitment to
GDPR, GOOGLE, https://privacy.google.com/businesses/compliance/#!?modal_active=
none [https://perma.cc/EP2S-T2S3]. See also Ashley Stenning, Gone but Not Forgotten:
Recognizing the Right to Be Forgotten in the U.S. to Lessen the Impacts of Data Breaches,
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changes in data protection policies have also had a significant
impact on other business areas in the United States, as well as in
many other countries. EU law has indeed become a de facto standard
for American technology companies in respect of data flows into
the United States.175 For example, cloud-based-services offered by
American providers to individuals in the EU have been modified to
be in line with GDPR privacy policy requirements.176 The evolution
of data protection in Europe has also influenced the path of American public policy. Nevertheless, consequent changes would not be a
mere reaction to an apparent economic threat from the old continent,
but rather the result of a number of converging technological, social,
and legal changes in the field of privacy and data protection in
the United States.177 The alarmist consequences about the loss of
privacy reported by the new Harris poll mentioned above illustrate
this phenomenon.178
As a response to these consequences, and considering the GDPR
as a model, on June 28, 2018, the state of California adopted the
CCPA, which goes into eﬀect on January 1, 2020. In addition to the
CCPA, the Privacy Rights for California Minors in the Digital
World Act, effective as of January 1, 2015, prohibits the collection
of personal data of minors that would be shared with third parties
for the purpose of advertising or marketing.179 The most significant
feature of the California legislation is the provision granting to
minors a right to be forgotten.180 A California resident who is under
18 years of age is allowed to request the permanent deletion of any
online content that is collected and stored about them by an online
service company.181
18 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 129, 157 (2016) (confirming that “American-based websites are
already conforming their policies and actions to the privacy laws of the EU”).
175
Maja Brkan, The Unstoppable Expansion of the EU Fundamental Rights to Data
Protection, 23 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 815, 841 (2016).
176
See W. Gregory Voss, European Union Data Privacy Law Reform: General Data
Protection Regulation, Privacy Shield, and the Right to Delisting, 72 BUS. L. 221, 223
(2017).
177
See Priscilla M. Regan, The Globalization of Privacy: Implications of Recent Changes
in Europe, 52 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 257, 270 (1993).
178
See AICPA, supra note 73.
179
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22580–22582 (West 2015).
180
Id. § 22581(a)(1).
181
Id.
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The CCPA is the most rigorous general privacy and data security
law in the United States. Even if, at first sight, the fact that this
California law applies only to consumers makes the CCPA’s scope
of application appear narrower than the GDPR’s scope,182 the effective territorial reach of the CCPA will not be limited to California.
Since the headquarters of hundreds of high technology companies
are in the region commonly known as “Silicon Valley,” the CCPA
will reach their operations in most, if not all, of the states.183
The CCPA incorporates in California law a large number of personal data rights found in the GDPR. It gives Californian consumers
an effective means of control over their personal information. The
CCPA defines “personal information” as any information that
“identifies, relates to, describes, is capable of being associated
with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a
particular consumer or household.”184 According to the Act, particularly (1) common identifiers that, when used, may allow the identification of the individual to whom the information in question may
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See California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1978.140(g). A
resident is defined as “every individual who is in the State for other than a temporary or
transitory purpose, and every individual who is domiciled in the State who is outside the
State for a temporary or transitory purpose.” CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17014 (West
2019). Any “business” gathering the “personal information” of a consumer as defined
above should comply with the CCPA. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1978.140. The definitions of
“business” and “personal information” require explanation as well. The term of “business”
is described fairly broadly, and it applies to any industry, whatever the method used to
collect data, which is not the case at the federal level. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1978.140(c). To
be more exact, the CCPA applies to any company that collects the personal information of
Californians, is for profit, does business in California, and exceeds $25 million in gross
revenue; handles the personal information of 50,000 or more consumers, devices or
households; or derive more than 50% of their annual revenue from selling consumers
personal information. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.140(c)(1)(A)-(C). Hence, even though it
will only be a state law, its broad jurisdictional reach means that it will actually apply to
companies throughout the United States and around the world.
183
Fortune 1000 cited, particularly, Adobe Systems, Advanced Micro Devices (AMD),
Agilent Technologies, Alphabet Inc. (formerly Google Inc.), Apple Inc., Applied
Materials, Cisco Systems, eBay, Electronic Arts, Facebook, Hewlett Packard Enterprise,
HP Inc., Intel, Intuit, Juniper Networks, KLA Tencor, Lam Research, LSI Logic, Maxim
Integrated Products, NetApp, Netflix, Nvidia, Oracle Corporation, Salesforce.com,
Sanmina-SCI, Symantec, Tesla, Inc., Visa Inc., Western Digital Corporation, Xilinx.
Fortune 1000 (2019), SOMEKA, https://www.someka.net/excel-template/fortune-1000excel-list/ [https://perma.cc/77RC-27DW].
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CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1).
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relate;185 (2) electronic network activity information, including,
browser histories, search history, and any information regarding a
consumer’s interaction with a Web site, application or advertisement;186 (3) audio, electronic, visual, thermal, and olfactory information;187 and (4) geolocation data are considered personal
information.188 Moreover, the CCPA provides that any “inferences”
drawn from various data elements of personal information “to create
a profile about a consumer reflecting the consumer’s preference,
characteristics, psychological trends, preferences, predispositions,
behavior, attitudes, intelligence, abilities and aptitudes” constitutes
personal information.189
The adoption of the CCPA constitutes a non-negligible shift in
the nation’s data privacy regime. First, the Act entitles consumers to
know the categories and specific pieces of personal information that
a business has collected within the past year, sold to a third party, or
disclosed to another person for a business process.190 Second, the
CCPA requires companies to provide consumers choice to opt out
of the sale of their personal information, and companies are not allowed to discriminate, with respect to prices or services, against consumers who opt out.191 The personal information of individuals under sixteen years cannot be sold, unless the latter exercise their
“right to opt in”—i.e. they allow such sharing.192 Third, the Act
states that businesses have to be open about their privacy policies,
disclosing for example a list of the types of personal information
gathered, sold, or disclosed to third parties over the last twelve
months.193 Fourth, the Act provides a private right of action seeking
damages or relief for consumers whose personal data “is subject to
an unauthorized access and exfiltration, theft, or disclosure as a result of the business’ violation of the duty to implement and maintain

185
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187
188
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192
193

Id. § (1)(A).
Id. § (1)(F).
Id. § (1)(H).
Id. § (1)(G).
See id. § (1)(K).
Id. § 1798.100(a).
Id. § 120(a).
See id. § 120(d).
See id. § 130(a)(5)(C)(i).
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reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the information.”194 The statute also provides that violations
can result in Attorney General investigation and enforcement under
the Business and Professions Code if, after a thirty-day period, the
business has not managed to cure the alleged violation.195 Fifth, the
Act entitles consumers to a “right to delete,” allowing them to request that a business delete any information collected about the consumer.196 A business that receives such a request must delete the
information gathered and direct any “service providers” to do the
same.197 The CCPA nevertheless provides that the “right to delete”
cannot be exercised in a small number of circumstances, such as
when the information is needed to complete a particular transaction
for the consumer, to detect security incidents, or to ensure the right
of another consumer to exercise his or her free speech.198
A similar balance between diverse interests can be found in the
GDPR as well. Recital 65 of the GDPR details the circumstances in
which an organization’s right to process someone’s data might override an individual’s right to erase. An asserted interest in processing
data takes priority over the right of erasure if the data:
1) is used to exercise the right of freedom of
expression;
2) is used to comply with a legal ruling or obligation;
3) is used to perform a task carried out in the public
interest or when exercising an organization’s official
authority;
4) is necessary for public health purposes and its
divulgation serves the public interest;
5) is necessary to perform preventative or occupational medicine (provided the data is processed by
a health professional who is subject to a legal obligation of professional secrecy);
6) represents important information that serves
the public interest, scientific research, historical
194
195
196
197
198

See id. § 150(b)(1).
See id. § 155(a).
See id. § 105(a).
See id. § 1798.105(c).
See id. § 1798.105(d).
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research, or statistical purposes and where erasure of
the data would be likely to hinder the achievement
that was the goal of the processing; and
7) is used to establish of a legal defense or other legal
claims.199
This comparison of the CCPA and the GDPR reveals that,
even if the rules aimed at protecting personal data are relatively
recent, the legislative and regulatory developments in the United
States and the EU point toward a harmonization process of data
protection standards through the propagation of data protection
laws and their substantive convergence. In this sense, rules on both
sides of the Atlantic have been mutually shaping each other. The
efforts in the United States at the state level to bring about a comprehensive data protection reform in conformity with the GDPR
recognizes the GDPR’s potential to be a legislative guide for a
greater globalization.200
Since the start of 2019, the “California Effect,” whereby legislatures take the CCPA as a model for their own data protection and
privacy bills, has been felt in many states, including Hawaii,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Mexico, New York,
Washington, and North Dakota.201 Hence, at least at the state level,
several American lawmakers set a new balance on the basis of the
GDPR enabling diverse interests to coexist in an environment that
fosters public awareness of—and respect for—privacy/data protection. The new laws set forth expansive catch-all rules and standards
that provide general data security guidelines to address previously
neglected regulatory areas or issues.202 That is why, for the time
being, it seems that there is no “race to the bottom” in global standards. Far from seeking to lower data protection requirements, state
legislatures are consolidating the effective alignment of standards
with the GDPR. That is not the end of the problems, but it is the
beginning of solutions.
199

See GDPR, supra note 17, recital 65.
For a similar view, see generally Michael D. Birnhack, The EU Data Protection
Directive: An Engine of a Global Regime, 24 COMP. L. & SEC. REP. 508 (2008).
201
See generally Marmor et al., supra note 42.
202
DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 848–49 (5th
ed. 2014).
200
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B. Need for Large-Scale Projects
Although state-level laws and regulations in the United States,
such as the newly adopted CCPA, have benefits, they also give rise
to significant challenges. Even if most state unfair or deceptive acts
and practices statutes empower state Attorneys General to issue
rules and regulations interpreting the law and establishing prohibited
conduct,203 effective enforcement of the new rules at the state level
does demand more cooperation and coordination between the FTC
and state Attorneys General.
State laws will likely remain ineffective for two reasons.204 The
first reason behind the inefficiency of state-level regulations is that
they are subject to federal law preemption.205 Indeed, constitutional
challenges can—and do—occasionally invalidate state privacy
laws.206 The second fact explaining the ineffectiveness of state-level
regulations is that they often conflict with one another. Even if states
have started to apply data protection rights as a component of
the right to self-determination in general and of consumer law in
particular, this process is too erratic to establish a national regime
in line with rising international standards.207 Differences in state
laws are likely affect consumers negatively, because the same type
of information might well be protected in one state while remaining
unprotected in another.208 Some states set higher data protection
standards than others, and discrepancies also exist between state and
federal levels, with the result that businesses can face considerable
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Cary Silverman & Jonathan L. Wilson, State Attorney General Enforcement of Unfair
or Deceptive Acts and Practices Laws: Emerging Concerns and Solutions, 65 KAN. L. Rev.
209, 212 (2016).
204
Jolly, supra note 85, at 2.
205
Schwartz, supra note 34, at 1976–77.
206
Id. at 1977 (“It struck down a Vermont law that prohibited the sale, disclosure, and
use of pharmacy records by ‘detailers,’ who used the information to help target doctors for
the sale of prescription pharmaceuticals.”) (referencing Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S.
Ct. 2653, 2659–60 (2011)).
207
See Nuala O’Connor, Reforming the U.S. Approach to Data Protection and Privacy,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 30, 2018), www.cfr.org/report/reforming-us-approachdata-protection [https://perma.cc/3ZQZ-RTGA].
208
See Daniel Solove, The Growing Problems with the Sectoral Approach to Privacy
Law, TEACH PRIVACY (Nov. 13, 2015), https://teachprivacy.com/problems-sectoralapproach-privacy-law/ [https://perma.cc/MQ2K-2W78].
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difficulty in determining the correct standard of compliance.209
Moreover, the choice of protecting privacy at the state level is not
the best solution for businesses, because of the enormous transaction
costs involved in complying with different sets of rules across several jurisdictions, especially when each has its own unique matrix
of privacy protections.210 Presently, cost-benefit analysis might lead
American businesses to restrict their commercial activities to their
local areas.211
These issues, which are critical to consumers and businesses
alike, make the adoption of a comprehensive federal privacy legislation not only more desirable, but also more realistic in the context
of the twenty-first century’s data protection challenges. If the federal
government were to enact a data protection law along the lines of
the EU’s regime, companies could accomplish international
transfers and rapidly expand into international markets.212
While various members of Congress have proposed bills to
create a federal data privacy statute or data protection board,213
nothing has passed through both the Senate and the House.214
On February 26, 2019, the Consumer Protection and Commerce
Subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee held
a hearing titled “Protecting Consumer Privacy in the Era of Big
Data.” Subcommittee chair Jan Schakowsky (D-IL) referred to the
inefficacy of the system in her opening statement: “Reports of the
abuse of personal information undoubtedly give Americans the
creeps. . . . Without a comprehensive federal privacy law, the burden has fallen completely on consumers to protect themselves. This
209

Paul J. Watanabe, An Ocean Apart: The Transatlantic Data Privacy Divide and the
Right to Erasure, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 1111, 1118, 1123 (2017).
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Cobb, supra note 129, at 3, 5.
211
Id. at 8.
212
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 837, 842–44 (1960)
(arguing that, without transaction costs, commercial actors will always favor the course of
action most effective in allocating wealth).
213
Matthew Humerick, The Tortoise and the Hare of International Data Privacy Law:
Can the United States Catch Up to Rising Global Standards?, 27 CATH. U. J.L. & TECH.
77, 99 (2018).
214
Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2014, H.R. 3990, 113th Cong. (2d Sess.
2014); Data Security Act of 2014, S. 1927, 113th Cong. (2d Sess. 2014); Data Security Act
of 2015, S. 961, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015). See also Justin Brookman, Protecting
Privacy in an Era of Weakening Regulation, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 355, 367–68 (2015).
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must end.”215 One day later, the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation held a hearing on “Policy Principles for
a Federal Data Privacy Framework in the United States.” During his
opening address, Senator Roger Wicker (R-MS) said the following:
“It is clear to me that we need a strong, national privacy law that
provides baseline data protections, applies equally to business entities—both online and offline—and is enforced by the nation’s top
privacy enforcement authority, the Federal Trade Commission.”216
The FTC already works to protect privacy and improve
data security in the online market,217 particularly when it comes
to behavioral advertising. For example, the FTC has issued the
following guidance:
The most practical method of providing uniform
choice for online behavioral advertising would likely
involve placing a setting similar to a persistent
cookie on a consumer’s browser and conveying that
setting to sites that the browser visits, to signal
whether or not the consumer wants to be tracked or
receive targeted advertisements. To be effective,
there must be an enforceable requirement that sites
honor those choices.218
However, the compliance with its recommended standards, particularly with those aiming at regulating behavioral advertising through
215

Protecting Consumer Privacy in the Era of Big Data: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Consumer Protection and Commerce, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Jan
Schakowsky, Chair, S. Comm. on Consumer Protection and Commerce) https://energy
commerce.house.gov/sites/democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/files/documents/0226
%20JS%20Opening%20Statement%20CPC%20Data%20Hearing.pdf
[http://perma.cc/C3XU-55A4].
216
Tom Ramstack, US Senate Seeks Federal Data Regulation That Could Preempt
Colorado Law, COLO. POL. (Feb. 28, 2019), www.coloradopolitics.com/news/us-senateseeks-federal-data-regulation-that-could-preempt-colorado/article_3ca59efa-3b59-11e9afee-4b5826c3cbe4.html [https://perma.cc/N7V3-NNT4].
217
See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY UPDATE: 2018,
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/privacy-data-security-update-2018/2018privacy-data-security-report-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/835Q-BNXZ].
218
FED. TRADE COMM’N, A PRELIMINARY FTC STAFF REPORT ON PROTECTING CONSUMER
PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES
AND POLICYMAKERS, vii (2010), www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J8RR-3LQT].
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a “Do Not Track Mechanism,”219 is voluntary.220 This is the reason
why the FTC’s requirements fall far short of creating a compelling
incentive for online companies to honor a consumer’s Do Not Track
request. In order to remedy this issue, on May 21, 2019, Senator
Hawley introduced the Do Not Track Act, which aims to give consumers the power to block online companies from collecting any
data beyond what is necessary for the companies’ online services.221
The FTC’s authority and investigative tools would become more
effective if political opinion coalesced into a nascent consensus that
consumers must be given more control over the collection and use
of their information, and if that consensus actually led to the passage
of a federal data privacy act. According to Hyman and Kovacic,
“Congress would eliminate the FTC’s jurisdictional limitations and
give it the authority to enforce privacy across the board—including
against not-for-profit institutions.”222 Humerick argues that “[E]ven
if Congress does not ease the burden, the FTC must promulgate
a rule that establishes a standard for general data protection and
requires industry agencies to monitor data protection compliance
throughout the States.”223 If the political will does develop to invigorate the FTC’s role in data protection, further study into whether
219

See Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, To Track or “Do Not Track”: Advancing
Transparency and Individual Control in Online Behavioral Advertising, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI.
& TECH. 281, 283 (2012) (defining “tracking” as an “activity [which] involves a third party,
largely unfamiliar to the user, collecting and processing information about her based on
her browsing activity on various unrelated websites in order to compile an individual
profile, which will be used to facilitate the targeting of ads”) (citing What Does “Do Not
Track” Mean?, CTR. DEMOCRACY & TECH. 3, 5 (2011), http://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/CDTDNT-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6GU-4AKZ]).
220
Alexander Nill & Robert J. Aalbert, Legal and Ethical Challenges of Online
Behavioral Targeting in Advertising, 35 J. CURRENT ISSUES & RES. ADVERT. 126, 137
(2014).
221
Senator Hawley to Introduce Legislation to Give the American People a “Do Not
Track” Option, JOSH HAWLEY (May 20, 2019), www.hawley.senate.gov/senator-hawleyintroduce-legislation-give-american-people-do-not-track-option [https://perma.cc/VH4WE6GV].
222
David Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Implementing Privacy Policy: Who Should Do
What?, 29 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1117, 1142 (2019).
223
See Humerick, supra note 213, at 82 (citing Alex Y. Seita, Globalization and the
Convergence of Values, 30 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 429, 472–76 (1997) (discussing how the
increasing globalization of trade and the importance of data collection serve as impetuses
for the United States to adopt federal privacy standards to ease international data transfer
relations)); Amanda C. Border, Untangling the Web: An Argument for Comprehensive
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the FTC could use antitrust law as an appropriate tool to encourage
businesses to offer better privacy protections would become
particularly valuable.224 The potential importance of antitrust action
in this area arises from the non-rivalrous nature of data:
[D]ata is ‘non rivalrous’ in the sense that access to
data by an operator does not, in and of itself, preclude
access by other operators. Multi-homing by customers as well as the diversification of services offered
by a single firm provides opportunities for the concurrent collection of user-specific data. However,
accessing this data in the first place may be conditioned on the capacity for the firm to build a
sufficiently large customer base, which in turn depends on the extent to which network and experience
effects as well as scale economies act as [a potential]
barrier to entry[, or] an element of such barrier and
thus as a factor which limits competition.225
This point of view is shared by numerous American lawyers, too.226
A former Commissioner at the FTC, for instance, highlighted the
fact that the entrenched sector-specific businesses’ “data-driven”
Data Privacy Legislation in the United States, 35 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 363, 384
(proposing that “the United States should shift away from its “piecemeal approach” to
data privacy”).
224
See generally MAURICE E. STUCKE & ALLEN P. GRUNES, BIG DATA AND COMPETITION
POLICY 2–3 (2016); D. Daniel Sokol & Roisin E. Comerford, Antitrust and Regulating Big
Data, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1129 (2016); Maureen K. Ohlhausen & Alexander P.
Okuliar, Competition, Consumer Protection, and the Right [Approach] to Privacy, 80
ANTITRUST L.J. 121 (2015).
225
Competition Law and Data, AUTORITÉ DE LA CONCURRENCE & BUNDESKARTELLAMT
28, 53 (May 10, 2016), www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/DE/Berichte/
Big%20Data%20Papier.pdf;jsessionid=1EC8E78261D1A13AC50E59F111CCCDB0.2_c
id371?__blob=publicationFile&v=2 [https://perma.cc/J387-MZCX].
226
See, e.g., Daniel Castro & Michael Steinberg, Blocked: Why Some Companies Restrict
Data Access to Reduce Competition and How Open APIs Can Help, CTR. FOR DATA
INNOVATION 17 (2017), www2.datainnovation.org/2017-open-apis.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6YZR-R2V9] (arguing it would be more appropriate to focus on “the entrenched sectorspecific businesses that can use their exclusive access to key industry data to restrict
competition in their industry” than “on large tech companies, such as Facebook or
Google”) (citing Joe Kennedy, “The Myth of Data Monopoly: Why Antitrust Concerns
About Data Are Overblown,” INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. (2017), http://www2.
itif.org/2017-data-competition.pdf [https://perma.cc/CC6C-SNS5].
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conducts may operate as a barrier to entry, and as such justify
enforcement actions.227
In the United States, most experts and academics too support the
idea of an explicit individual right to regulate consumer data
privacy.228 In addition, a bipartisan agreement appears to have
developed concerning the need to fill the gap in data protection at
federal level. The Former First Chief Privacy Officer for the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, Nuala O’Connor, has offered
this explanation of the need to codify a federal law:
Most Western countries have already adopted comprehensive legal protections for personal data, but the
United States—home to some of the most advanced,
and largest, technology and data companies in the
world—continues to lumber forward with a patchwork of sector-specific laws and regulations that fail
to adequately protect data. U.S. citizens and companies suffer from this uneven approach—citizens
because their data is not adequately protected, and
companies because they are saddled with contradictory and sometimes competing requirements.229
There is nevertheless no general consensus as to what specifically the solution would be.230 The devil will be in the details. If
Congress actually decides to pursue legislative action, it will have
227
Terrell McSweeny & Brian O’Dea, Data, Innovation, and Potential Competition in
Digital Markets—Looking Beyond Short-Term Price Effects in Merger Analysis, CPI
ANTITRUST CHRON. 2 (Feb. 2018), www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/
uploads/2018/02/CPI-McSweeny-ODea.pdf [https://perma.cc/GPW9-N443].
228
See, e.g., Jugpreet Mann, Small Steps for Congress, Huge Steps for Online Privacy,
37 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 365, 388 (2015); Alex Y. Seita, Globalization and the
Convergence of Values, 30 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 429, 472–76 (1997).
229
O’Connor, supra note 207.
230
See Stephen P. Mulligan, Chris D. Linebaugh & Wilson C. Freeman, Congressional
Research Service Report: Data Protection Law: An Overview, CONG. RES. SERV. 1, 3 (Mar.
25, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45631.pdf [perma.cc/AXL6-MTJK] (“[C]oncerns
that existing federal laws are inadequate ha[ve] led many stakeholders to argue that the
federal government should assume a larger role in data protection policy. However, at
present, there is no consensus as to what, if any, role the federal government should play,
and any legislative efforts at data protection are likely to implicate unique legal concerns
such as preemption, standing, and First Amendment rights, among other issues.”) (citations
omitted).
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to deal with serious issues, such as: What protection for what categories of data? For what data uses will customer have opt-out rights?
What about opt-in rights? Should there be a private right of action?
Despite all these uncertainties, the adoption of a federal privacy law
creating a nationwide standard clearly would not only bring the
European and American systems closer to each other, at least at the
systematic level, but would also increase convergence between
different regulatory systems within the United States.
Two main reasons lie behind the desire in the United States to
craft a unified law that would broaden the scope of data protection.231 Firstly, the current rules governing privacy—both at federal
and state level in several states—do not offer protection sufficient
to the task of responding effectively to concerns associated with
today’s and tomorrow’s data breaches, and do not meet the expectations of consumers that are insufficiently informed of how their data
is used.232 Secondly, even though some courts create new exceptions
to existing rules or broaden the existing exceptions, the case law
is still far from settled regarding how to remedy the data protection
shortfall, and does not provide a satisfactory level of legal certainty.233 The climate of legal uncertainty caused by varying national
approaches contributes to increasing the costs of legal services on
which businesses rely in order to comply with different rules.234 As
231

Id. at 54–61.
See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., INTERNET PRIVACY: ADDITIONAL
FEDERAL AUTHORITY COULD ENHANCE CONSUMER PROTECTION AND PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY
1, 17–19 (2019), www.gao.gov/assets/700/696437.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SX7-PLC9]
(citing public opinion surveys about public concerns over the protection of consumer data);
see also Mary Madden, Public Perception of Privacy and Security in the Post-Snowden
Era, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 12, 2014), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2014/11/
12/public-privacy-perceptions/ [http://perma.cc/M79V-W349] (highlighting that 64% of
Americans think that the government should get more involved in regulating advertisers’
privacy practices).
233
Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data Breach
Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 739 (2018) (“The concept of harm stemming from a data
breach has confounded the lower courts. There has been no consistent or coherent judicial
approach to data-breach harms.”).
234
Small Businesses Data Regulation and Responsibility, CONNECTED COMMERCE
COUNCIL 39 (2019), https://connectedcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/SmallBusinesses-Data-Regulation-and-Responsibility.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JRN2-HLFX]
(citing that “state laws would vary too much to make it financially possible for small
companies to adhere to”).
232
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a recent survey shows, the modernization of existing national legislation would provide legal certainty not only for consumers but also,
and particularly, for business.235
Legal scholars and policy analysts have already raised ideas,
made proposals, and described implementation scenarios in respect
of future data protection law at the national level.236 Although many
think that an EU-style law would not be compatible with the culture
and structure of American law,237 conformity with the fundamental
principles and rights of the GDPR would eliminate, to some extent,
barriers to the transfer of personal information from one continent
to another, as well as barriers to the operation of the global economic
system.238 Indeed, data’s free-flowing nature requires an allembracing legislation.239 However, this view does not imply that the
role of national courts in developing a case-by-case test to deal with
privacy and data protection claims should be disregarded. Legislative frameworks set standards which leave room for courts to decide
under what circumstances a data breach occurs.
III. COURTS’ EFFORTS TO DEVELOP AN EFFECTIVE AND BALANCED
PROTECTION
In addition to the intention on both sides of the Atlantic to adopt
a more liberal approach to data privacy by way of legislative reform,
the court decision in the United States and the EU have emphasized
to protect private information as an aspect of the principle of selfdetermination. The tests applied by the ECJ to public disclosure of
235

Id. at 40.
See, e.g., Kerry, supra note 22.
237
Woodrow Hartzog & Neil Richards, Privacy’s Constitutional Moment, 61 B.C. L.
Rev. (forthcoming 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3441502
[https://perma.cc/J97G-99S2].
238
According to a study, cultural differences are mediated by regulations. See Steve
Bellman, Eric Johnson, Stephen Kobrin & Gerald Lohse, International Differences in
Information Privacy Concerns: A Global Survey of Consumers, 30 INFO. SOC’Y 1, 7 (2004).
239
See Cory Bennett, Lawmakers See Momentum for Data Breach Legislation, HILL (Jan.
27, 2015, 12:34 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/230867-data-breach-bill-isachievable-goal [https://perma.cc/56WZ-63WU]; see also ROLF H. WEBER & DOMINIC N.
STAIGER, TRANSATLANTIC DATA PROTECTION IN PRACTICE 134 (2017) (pointing out that
“in addition to the industry protection, legal minimum standards should be set on a[n]
international level in order to ensure that basic measures and protection are implemented”).
236
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private facts are not significantly different than those applied by
American courts. On the contrary, the case analysis shows that their
practical concerns and approaches are rather similar.
A. Practical Concerns and Approaches in the EU: Beyond Google
Spain
My study of EU law leads to two main findings. First, the ECJ’s
approach is based on a case-by-case examination of different fundamental rights and other interests. Second, this approach permits the
right to privacy to coexist with the right to access information and
with freedom of expression, as evidenced by a statistical inference
based on data derived directly from Google.
1. Case-by-Case Appraisal
One might wonder whether the parallel I have drawn between
the American and European legislative efforts to establish new
standards regarding the scope of the right to privacy and data
security240 is supported by court-made law developed in the longstanding struggle to find a fair solution to various data protection
issues. I will demonstrate that, although the ECJ has broadened the
scope of data protection in the EU, it did not ultimately lead to an
imbalance that would unduly favor data protection over other rights.
To get a full picture of the application of data protection law in the
EU, Google Spain241 should be read in tandem with the recent Manni
decision.242 Comparing this study with the case law established by
American courts would illuminate the similarities and differences of
both approaches. I will first sketch briefly Google Spain, which held
that EU law gives persons a right to erase personal information from
the Internet.243 I will then study Manni, where the ECJ highlighted
240

See supra Part III.
Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, 2014
E.C.R. 317.
242
Case C-398/15, Camera di Commercio, Industria, Artigianato e Agricoltura di Lecce
v. Salvatore Manni, 2016 E.C.R. 652, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?
text=&docid=183142&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1
&cid=3853759 [https://perma.cc/8Z25-NB83].
243
Google Spain has been the object of several studies in the United States and Europe.
The comments cover a wide range of opinions. Whereas some call the decision “clinically
insane” others argue that the decision “indicates a renewed and vehement commitment to
241
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that the right to erase established in Google Spain is not
unconditional and needs to be balanced against conflicting interests.
The contrast between these two decisions gives a full picture of
the Court’s implementation of the balancing test and reveals the
conditions in which the right to erase is to be exercised.
The Google Spain case started with a Spanish citizen, Mario
Costeja González, filing a complaint with the Spanish Data
Protection Agency against a local newspaper, La Vanguardia, and
Google Spain.244 In 1998, the newspaper had published announcements about real estate auctions held to secure repayment of Mr.
González’s social security debts.245 The newspaper’s auction notices
had also been made available on the web.246 In November 2009, Mr.
González asked the local newspaper to delete the pages or alter them
so that his personal data would no longer be displayed.247 Over ten
years after their publication, Mr. González argued that these pages
were no longer necessary because “the attachment proceedings
concerning him had been fully resolved for a number of years and
that reference to them was now entirely irrelevant.”248 He also contacted Google Spain, asking for the links to the articles in question
to be removed so that his personal data no longer appeared in Google
Search results.249 Google Spain forwarded the request to Google Inc.
Subsequently, Mr. González sought the help of the Spanish Data
Protection Agency. The latter rejected his claims against the newspaper,250 but upheld those against Google Spain and Google Inc.251

the protection of privacy . . . .” See Interview with David Hoffman, Director of Security
Policy and Global Privacy Officer, Intel, STEPTOE CYBERBLOG (Sept. 3, 2014),
www.steptoe.com/images/content/5/9/v1/5905/SteptoeCyberlawPodcast-032.mp3
https://perma.cc/Q3WN-CEZQ; Eleni Frantziou, Further Developments in the Right to be
Forgotten: The European Court of Justice’s Judgment in Case C-131/12, Google Spain,
SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, 14 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 761,
776 (2014).
244
Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, at ¶ 14.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at ¶ 15.
248
Id.
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Id. at ¶ 16.
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Id. at ¶ 17.
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Google Spain and Google Inc. separately appealed to Spain’s
high court.252 Google Inc. argued that the company was not within
the scope of the EU Directive 95/46/EC.253 Google Spain argued
that it was not responsible for the algorithm of the search engine,
since, according to the Company, its activity is limited to providing
support to Google Inc.’s advertising activity, which is separate
from its search engine service.254 Google Spain and Google Inc. both
argued that there was no processing of personal data within the
search function; that even were there processing, neither Google Inc.
nor Google Spain could be regarded as a data controller; and that
in any event, the data subject did not have the right to erasure of
lawfully published material.255 Google Inc., in turn, referred to the
ECJ, among others, the preliminary question as to whether an individual has the right to request that their personal data be removed
from search results.256 The ECJ ruled that the European citizens are
entitled to request that search engines that collect personal data for
profit, such as Google, should remove links to private information
(e.g. a person’s full name) when asked, as long as the information is
no longer relevant.257 Based upon this decision, Google Inc. created
a form that enables European citizens to request to have outdated
and irrelevant search results on European domains removed.258 The
Court did not define exactly what is newsworthy in terms of time,
but it seems that a ten-year time period—from 1998 to 2009—is
enough for lay persons’ social security debts to become irrelevant
for public interest.259 In the United States, the FCRA requires, in a

252
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See Christopher Kuner, Google Spain in the EU and International Context, 22
MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 158, 159–64 (2015) (discussing the jurisdictional
implications of the decision).
259
Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, at ¶ 98. The ECJ ruled that “having regard to the
sensitivity for the data subject’s private life of the information contained in those
announcements and to the fact that its initial publication had taken place 16 years earlier,
the data subject establishes a right that that information should no longer be linked to his
name by means of such a list.” The 16-year period mentioned by the ECJ covers a period
of time from the claim to the decision. Id.
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similar way, credit agencies to remove most negative credit information after seven years and bankruptcies after seven to ten years,
depending on the kind of bankruptcy.260
In Google Spain, the ECJ did not require the publisher (La
Vanguardia) to remove the content that the plaintiff had sought to
have deleted.261 The right to erase personal information does not
alter the content on the web, but merely the online search results.262
In his opinion, the Advocate General confirmed that “the Directive
does not provide for a general right to be forgotten in the sense
that a data subject is entitled to restrict or terminate dissemination
of personal data that he considers to be harmful or contrary to his
interests.”263 The resource thus does not disappear; it remains active
and can be further circulated, although it becomes less accessible.264
In fact, when read in tandem with the recent Google decision handed
down by the ECJ in September 2019,265 the ruling basically applies
to search engines within the borders of the EU the current rights to
rectification, erasure, blocking, and objection which already existed
in the previous Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC.266 It is not
necessary to find that links are prejudicial to the data subject.267 The
Court decided that the fundamental right to privacy should be considered more important than the economic interest of a commercial

260

15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(2) (2018).
Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, at ¶¶ 16, 98.
262
Melanie Dulong de Rosnay & Andres Guadamuz, Memory Hole or Right to Delist?
Implications of the Right to be Forgotten for Web Archiving, 6 RESET SOCIAL SCI. RES.
INTERNET ¶ 3 (2016).
263
Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, at ¶ 108.
264
Samuel W. Royston, The Right to Be Forgotten: Comparing U.S. and European
Approaches, 48 ST. MARY’S L.J. 253, 273–74 (2016) (arguing that “de-linking is not
censorship because the data is deleted from the search engine but not from the entire
Internet[, which] is tantamount to allowing a book to remain on library shelves but
redacting all of the pages”).
265
Case C‑507/17, Google LLC v. Commission nationale de l’informatique et des
libertés (CNIL), 2019 E.C.R. 772, ¶ 73.
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Melanie Dulong de Rosnay & Andres Guadamuz, supra note 262, at ¶ 26.
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Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, at ¶ 99 (“[I]t should inter alia be examined whether
the data subject has a right that the information in question relating to him personally
should, at this point in time, no longer be linked to his name by a list of results displayed
following a search made on the basis of his name, without it being necessary in order to
find such a right that the inclusion of the information in question in that list causes prejudice
to the data subject.”).
261
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intermediary, provided the data subject is not seen as a public person
or a person who assumes a role in public life.268
In the EU, the essence of commercial activity is that the offering
of goods and/or services “must be capable of being carried on,
at least in principle, with a view to profit.”269 Neither the legal
status of the entity engaged in the activity nor the way in which it is
financed affects the law’s recognition of the commercial nature of
the activity.270 Moreover, in principle, no commerce occurs when
the state carries performs activities that the market could not provide.271 The question as to whether the entity organization or group
which disseminates information to the public carries out a commercial activity seems to have played a central role in the field of data
protection law. That data protection law developed via this route
becomes apparent when Google Spain is read in tandem with Manni.
Although both deal with the right to erase, the economic activities
of Google differentiate this case from Manni, where a government
agency disclosed official information about a registered business.272
Even though the American scholarly community has not given
close consideration to Manni, understanding this case is essential
to forming a complete picture of the right to erase in the EU.273 In
2007, Salvatore Manni, the sole director of a building company that
was building a tourist complex in Italy, brought an action before the
Italian Court of Lecce against the Lecce Chamber of Commerce.274
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Id. (“However, that would not be the case if it appeared, for particular reasons, such
as the role played by the data subject in public life, that the interference with his
fundamental rights is justified by the preponderant interest of the general public in having,
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v. Salvatore Manni, 2016 E.C.R. 652, ¶ 24, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
document/document.jsf?text=&docid=183142&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&d
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He argued that the properties built in that complex were not selling
because the company register specified that Mr. Manni had been the
sole director and liquidator of another building company that went
bankrupt in 1992 and was wound up in 2005.275 Mr. Manni also
alleged that, although he asked for his personal data to be removed
from the company register, the Chamber of Commerce had not complied.276 He therefore petitioned the Court for an order requiring the
Chamber to erase, anonymize, or block the information connecting
him to the bankrupt company.277 He also sought compensation for
the damage he suffered as a result of the injury to his reputation.278
The Court of Lecce agreed with Mr. Manni’s argument that
naming the sole director of the insolvent company which had been
liquidated over ten years ago was neither necessary nor useful.279
Accordingly, the Court ordered the Chamber of Commerce to
anonymize—but not remove—the data about the Applicant’s
involvement with the no-longer existing company.280 The Court
stated that the company register could not permanently maintain
the connection between a natural person and an insolvent company
“after an appropriate period” following the liquidation, even if
Italian law does not specify a maximum term for the retention of
data published in the company register.281 According to the Court,
there is no particular public interest in the disclosure of such an outdated information.282 Finally, the Court ordered the Chamber to pay
compensation for the harm done to the Applicant’s reputation, in
recognition of the fact that the latter had successfully demonstrated
that several potential buyers had brought an end to their negotiations
as a result of their discovery of the information regarding the
Applicant’s involvement in the bankrupt company.283
In 2012, the Chamber of Commerce appealed this decision
directly to the Italian Supreme Court—the appeal concerned the
275
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interpretation of the right to erase and its limits.284 Manni raised the
issue of how a person’s right to erase should be balanced against the
prevailing public interest in disclosing data concerning business
organizations.285 According to the Supreme Court, public registers,
such as the company register, promote the creation of sound commercial and social relations through providing a reliable record of
information essential to defining the legal status of commercial
entities and to ensuring the legal validity of their dealings.286
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court recognized the importance of the
right to erase, as it had been acknowledged by the ECJ in Google
Spain, as an important method of protecting personal identity.287
Faced with this dilemma, the Italian Supreme Court referred
preliminary questions to the ECJ.
In its preliminary decision, the ECJ held that the Applicant’s
right to erase could not supersede the right of the public to be
informed.288 Furthermore, the ECJ held that the disclosure of
the Applicant’s personal data kept in the company register by the
Lecce Chamber of Commerce was lawful, because registering and
disclosing this kind of official information protects third parties.289
The ECJ reasoned that this interference with the Applicant’s fundamental rights to a private life and the protection of personal data was
not disproportionate, because company registers disclose only a
limited amount of personal data, and because company executives
are obligated to disclose their identity and function within a company, even one that stopped trading years ago.290 The ECJ concluded
that, in exceptional circumstances, when the data subject proves the
existence of overriding and legitimate reasons to withhold disclosure, third parties might not be granted access to the data subject’s
personal information found in the company register.291 However,
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Id. at ¶ 29.
Id. at ¶¶ 43–44.
Id. at ¶ 43.
Id. at ¶ 37.
Id. at ¶ 63.
Id. at ¶¶ 49, 51, 60.
Id. at ¶ 60.
Id. at ¶ 64.
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this exception was limited by the proviso that the company must
have been dissolved for a sufficiently long period of time.292
As in Google Spain, the court did not specify when a period of
time became “sufficiently long” following the embarrassing fact, in
this case the dissolution of the Applicant’s company. The ECJ held
that, given the circumstances, it was not possible to identify an
appropriate maximum retention period regarding personal data kept
in publicly available registers.293 Unlike U.S. law, EU law does not
include any explicit regulation of personal data collected in public
registers.294 In the United States, the Federal Privacy Act establishes
a Code of Fair Information Practice295 that governs the collection,
maintenance, use, and dissemination of personal identifiable information about individuals that is maintained in systems of records by
federal agencies.296 In the absence of a comparable privacy act at the
EU level, the ECJ would have had to define the legitimate reasons
for preventing the disclosure of information contained in the public
record if it had ruled in favor of the Applicant. However, the ECJ
did not address this issue, because it concluded that third parties
had an overriding interest in having access to the public records
regarding the Applicant’s previous dealings and business history.297

292

Id.
Id. at ¶ 60.
294
Even if there is no regulation at the EU level, member states have adopted fair
information practices as law. See, e.g., Directive 1995/46 of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281)
31–51 (EC).
295
For the evolution of Fair Information Practices (FIPs), see generally ROBERT
GELLMAN, FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES: A BASIC HISTORY 1 (Apr. 10, 2017),
https://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPshistory.pdf [https://perma.cc/2B4C-D59P].
296
5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012); see generally Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices
and the Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn’t Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1
(2001).
297
Case C-398/15, Camera di Commercio, Industria, Artigianato e Agricoltura di Lecce
v. Salvatore Manni, 2016 E.C.R. 652, ¶¶ 32, 50, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=183142&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=f
irst&part=1&cid=3853759 [https://perma.cc/8Z25-NB83].
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In the EU, official public records of company details required by
law are meant to show, at a glance, the whole history and management of a company as correctly and as objectively as possible.298
Disclosing such records to the public, official registers are well
positioned to play a neutral intermediary role in ensuring openness,
transparency, and public availability of company data. This
approach mirrors the one found in many states’ public record acts299
as well as in court opinions in the United States.300
The register is not the source of the information it provides and
it has no control over the content of the information registered; its

298

See Directive 2009/101, art. 2, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16
September 2009 on Coordination Of Safeguards Which, For The Protection Of The
Interests Of Members And Third Parties, Are Required By Member States Of Companies
Within The Meaning Of The Second Paragraph Of Article 48 Of The Treaty, With A View
To Making Such Safeguards Equivalent, 2009 O.J. (L 258/11) 11–19 (EC) [hereinafter
Directive 2009/101] (“Member States shall take the measures required to ensure
compulsory disclosure by companies as referred to in Article 1 of at least the following
documents and particulars: (a) the instrument of constitution, and the statutes if they are
contained in a separate instrument; (b) any amendments to the instruments mentioned in
point (a), including any extension of the duration of the company; (c) after every
amendment of the instrument of constitution or of the statutes, the complete text of the
instrument or statutes as amended to date; (d) the appointment, termination of office and
particulars of the persons who either as a body constituted pursuant to law or as members
of any such body: (i) are authorised to represent the company in dealings with third parties
and in legal proceedings; it must be apparent from the disclosure whether the persons
authorised to represent the company may do so alone or must act jointly; (ii) take part in
the administration, supervision or control of the company; (e) at least once a year, the
amount of the capital subscribed, where the instrument of constitution or the statutes
mention an authorised capital, unless any increase in the capital subscribed necessitates an
amendment of the statutes; (f) the accounting documents for each financial year which are
required to be published . . . ; (h) the winding-up of the company; (i) any declaration of
nullity of the company by the courts; (j) the appointment of liquidators, particulars
concerning them, and their respective powers, unless such powers are expressly and
exclusively derived from law or from the statutes of the company; (k) the termination of
the liquidation and, in Member States where striking off the register entails legal
consequences, the fact of any such striking off.”).
299
See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6252(e) (2016) (defining the term “public records”
broadly as “information relating to the conduct of the public’s business [that is] prepared,
owned, used, or retained by any state or local agency regardless of the physical form or
characteristics”).
300
See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 472–73 (1975) (allowing
publication of rape victim’s name already available in a criminal indictment).
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only function is to enable third parties to ascertain information concerning the company in question.301 That point distinguishes Manni
from Google Spain. In fact, search engines do not have a passive
attitude regarding information they make accessible.302 Unlike
public registers, search engines not only collect information from its
source, but they also process the data.303 On the basis of the
algorithm they are using, search engines, as profit-making entities,
refer only to certain web pages and data fields, and in a particular
order when a specific term or name is entered.304 In 2006, AOL
imprudently released the search habits of 657,426 Internet users.305
The records revealed the following:
90 percent of the total clicks went to sites on the first
page of results;
74 percent of clicks went to the top five search
results;
the top result alone received 42 percent of all
clicks.306

301

Directive 2009/101, supra note 298, at recital 3.
For an empirical approach, see Sounman Hong, Does Google Distort Your ‘Click’?
Search Engines and the Emergence of Internet Monopolies 22 (June 23, 2016),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2799664 [https://perma.cc/C497-Y4U6] (“[T]his study offered
suggestive but compelling empirical evidence that search engines at least somewhat
contribute to the emergence of Internet monopolies.”).
303
The ECJ defined in Google Spain the activity of a search engine as follows:
[I]n exploring the internet automatically, constantly and systematically
in search of the information which is published there, the operator of a
search engine ‘collects’ such data which it subsequently ‘retrieves,’
‘records,’ and ‘organizes’ within the framework of its indexing
programmes, ‘stores’ on its servers and, as the case may be, ‘discloses’
and ‘makes available’ to its users in the form of lists of search results.
Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, Mario
Costeja Gonzalez, 2014 E.C.R. 317, at ¶ 28.
304
See Florent Thouvenin, Peter Hettich, Herbert Burkert & Urs Gasser, Remembering
and Forgetting in the Digital Age, 38 L. GOV. & TECH. SERIES 59, 62 (2018).
305
Following this incidence, AOL removed the search data from its site and apologized
for its release. See Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller Jr., Web Searchers’ Identities Traced
on AOL, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2006), www.nytimes.com/2006/08/09/technology/08cndaol.html [https://perma.cc/8RJ4-WFW5].
306
MATTHEW HINDMAN, THE MYTH OF DIGITAL DEMOCRACY 69 (2009).
302
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These figures, confirmed by more recent studies,307 show that
search engine rankings affect the user’s behavior. Higher ranked
results tend to attract more attention and, therefore, have a higher
chance of being accessed, whereas low ranked results may not
be visited even if they are more relevant to the user’s information
need. This makes us understand why search engines, just like
social media platforms, have a crucial role not only in forming
attitudes on topics ranging from fingernail care trends to presidential
elections, but also in influencing a person’s perception of others and
the judgments he or she formulates regarding them.308
Of course, this process of mutual influence alone cannot be held
as evidence conclusive enough to apply the right to erasure. The ECJ
pays close attention to the nature of the information in question, the
public’s interest in that information’s disclosure, and the possible
impact of such disclosure when determining whether or not the
information in question may be made publicly available.309 Here,
too, it is possible to draw a parallel between the two sides of the
Atlantic. In Reporters Committee, the Supreme Court applied a test
similar to the one applied by the ECJ in order to answer the question
of whether “rap sheets” compiled by the FBI were subject to disclosure upon a request made pursuant to the Freedom of Information
Act (“FOIA”).310 The Court opined that “the fact that an event is not
wholly “private” does not mean that an individual has no interests
in limiting disclosure or dissemination of the information,”311 and

307

Advanced Web Ranking has released a study showing fresh data on the click-throughrate from Google’s organic search results. The data was taken from Google Webmaster
Tools Search Queries reports from large accounts back in July 2014. On average, 71.33%
of searches resulted in a page one Google organic click. Pages two and three get only 5.59%
of the clicks. On the first page alone, the first five results account for 67.60% of all the
clicks and results six to ten account for only 3.73%. See Philip Petrescu, Google Organic
CTR—2014 Report, ADVANCED WEB RANKING BLOG (Apr. 15, 2019), www.advanced
webranking.com/blog/google-organic-ctr/ [https://perma.cc/2U28-UCYK].
308
Jeffrey Rosen, The Deciders: The Future of Privacy and Free Speech in the Age of
Facebook and Google, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1525, 1535 (2012).
309
Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, 2014
E.C.R. 317, ¶ 81.
310
See Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 772
(1989).
311
Id. at 770 (quoting William Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent
with Fair and Effective Law Enforcement?, KAN. L. SCH. pt. 1, p. 13 (Sept. 26, 1974)).
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determined that “whether disclosure of a private document under
the Freedom of Information Act [(“FOIA”)] Exemption 7(C) is
warranted must turn on the nature of the requested document.”312
In this case, the Court concluded that “[t]he privacy interest in a rap
sheet is substantial. The substantial character of that interest is
affected by the fact that in today’s society the computer can accumulate and store information that would otherwise have surely been
forgotten long before a person attains age eighty, when the FBI’s
rap sheets are discarded.”313
Keeping in mind the results the European courts reached in
various cases, it is clear that, at the EU level, there is no possible
pre-determined hierarchy between the protection of private life and
that of freedom of expression. Both rights are worthy of equal
respect, and it is impossible to draw a bright line between privacy/data protection and the public’s right to know.314 Indeed, as it
can be seen in several judgments rendered before Google Spain
as well, on the basis of Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter of the
Fundamental Rights, neither the right to erase nor the right to
freedom of expression is absolute.315 The exercise of both rights
depends on many variables and each request will have to be evaluated individually.316 This phenomenon leads some commentators to

312

Id. at 750.
Id. at 771.
314
Stefan Kulk & Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, Privacy, Freedom of Expression, and
the Right to Be Forgotten in Europe, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSUMER PRIVACY
320 (Jules Polonetsky & Omer Tene & Evan Selinger eds., 2018), https://pure.uva.nl/ws/
files/9113768/Kulk_Zuiderveen_Borgesius_RTBF_chapter_2Feb2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7DUK-EQ9P].
315
Case C-92/09, Volker und Markus Schecke GbR v. Land Hessen, 2010 E.C.R. I11063, ¶ 48; Case C-543/09, Deutsche Telekom AG v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2011
E.C.R. 279, ¶ 51, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A6200
9CJ0543 [https://perma.cc/2BXJ-VB7C]; Case C-291/12, Michael Schwarz v. Stadt
Bochum, 2013 E.C.R. 401, ¶ 33, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62012CC029
1&lang1=en&type=TXT&ancre= [https://perma.cc/5KLM-QWL2].
316
Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, 2014
E.C.R. 317, ¶ 81 (“[I]nasmuch as the removal of links from the list of results could,
depending on the information at issue, have effects upon the legitimate interest of internet
users potentially interested in having access to that information, in situations such as that
at issue in the main proceedings a fair balance should be sought in particular between that
interest and the data subject’s fundamental rights.”).
313
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think that the conditions to exercise these rights are vague in
the EU.317
However, one thing is clear: in the EU, individuals are entitled
to choose which aspects of their personal lives should be private and
protected against outside interferences, unless compelling reasons
justify restricting that right in certain areas of life or in specific
situations.318 Searching for the name of a specific individual “enables any Internet user to obtain through the list of results a structured
overview of the information . . . that can be found on the Internet . . .
and which, without the search engine, could not have been interconnected or could have been only with great difficulty—and thereby
to establish a more or less detailed profile.”319 In other words, the
search engine plays a crucial role in the dissemination of information, and search service providers have an economic interest in
such activity.320 The ECJ ruled that, neither the search service
provider’s interest in profit-making nor the public’s hypothetical
interest in outdated and irrelevant information—disclosure of which
is facilitated by the search engine—can be deemed a good enough
reason to interfere with individual self-determination.321
Nevertheless, as the Court of Amsterdam stated in a case where
it was asked to apply the Google Spain ruling, that rule “does not
intend to protect individuals against all negative communications on

317

See Miquel Peguera, The Shaky Ground of the Right to Be Delisted, 18 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 560 (2016).
318
See ECHR, supra note 55, art. 8 (“Right to Respect for Private and Family Life:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”)
319
Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, at ¶ 80.
320
For some, this means that search engines inevitably influencing the results they
display to individuals can be held responsible for selecting the information that is made
available to Internet users. In this vein, see Aleksandra Kuczerawy & Jef Ausloos, NoC
Online Intermediaries Case Studies Series: European Union and Google Spain, INTERDISC.
CTR FOR L. & ICT (ICRI), KU LEUVEN 22 (2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2567183 [https://perma.cc/V9WN-L98M].
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Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, 2014
E.C.R. 317, ¶¶ 81, 99.

202

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXX:139

the Internet, but only against ‘being pursued’ for a long time by
‘irrelevant’, ‘excessive’ or ‘unnecessarily defamatory’ expressions.”322 Manni is a good example of this limitation. In this case,
the ECJ ruled that, unlike the service offered by Google, the service
of a public register providing official and objective information
about the situation of a business cannot be considered intrusive into
private life.323
This decision should not be seen as contradicting Google Spain.
Although the categorical distinction between things private and
things public has been more recently developed and less clearly
formulated in American law than it has been in continental legal
traditions,324 everyone in both jurisdictions is entitled to access to
official records,325 albeit subject to certain limitations, and this right
of access is seen as one of the fundamental elements of a representative form of government.326 Manni reflects this policy. A business

322

ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2014:6118, 18 Sept. 2014, C/13/569654 / KG ZA 14–960,
https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2014:6118
[https://perma.cc/WD3G-7QM7]. For a comment, see Joran Spauwen & Jens van den
Brink, Dutch Google Spain Ruling: More Freedom of Speech, Less Right to Be Forgotten
for Criminals, INFORRM’S BLOG (Sept. 27, 2014), https://inforrm.org/2014/09/27/dutchgoogle-spain-ruling-more-freedom-of-speech-less-right-to-be-forgotten-for-criminalsjoran-spauwen-and-jens-van-den-brink/ [https://perma.cc/PMF3-JKU].
323
Case C-398/15, Camera di Commercio, Industria, Artigianato e Agricoltura di Lecce
v. Salvatore Manni, 2016 E.C.R. 652, ¶ 43.
324
Chaim Saiman, Public Law, Private Law, and Legal Science, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 691,
692 (2009) (“Despite more than a century of critique and deconstruction, the distinction
between private and public law continues to influence the structure of legal thought in the
civil law world, and of late, these categories have even migrated to common law
systems.”).
325
It nevertheless is true that, in Europe, the distinction is getting blurred in practice. See
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN
INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 27 (Thomas Burger trans., with the
assistance of Frederick Lawrence, 1989).
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See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 552.000(a) (West 2019) (“Under the fundamental philosophy
of the American constitutional form of representative government that adheres to the
principle that government is the servant and not the master of the people, it is the policy of
this state that each person is entitled, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, at all
times to complete information about the affairs of government and the official acts of
public officials and employees. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public
servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for
them to know. The people insist on remaining informed so that they may retain control
over the instruments they have created. The provisions of this chapter shall be liberally
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owner, whose business is registered with the public company register, normally has no reasonable expectation of confidentiality in
respect of that business’s financial records.327
2. Statistical Inference
Approximately 5.5 billion searches are conducted each day with
Google’s search engine.328 According to the Transparency Report,
which Google publishes each year, the company received 800,000
requests between May 2014 and May 2019 from EU citizens wishing to remove links to personal information from its index, which
would entail deleting approximately three million URLs.329 Even if,
at first sight, the number of such requests (an average of 600,000
per year) seems high, the impact of delisting on the free speech of
citizens is extremely limited. Google assesses each request on a
case-by-case basis. It is not compelled to accept all requests, and
does not do so. Arguably, “Google is a biased party, as its failure to
comply with the ruling leaves one percent of its global revenues at
stake[,] . . . [which creates] strong incentives to overreach and
remove links that do not deserve to be taken down.”330
What is sure is that this regime favoring self-regulation permits
the search engine company to operate as a private administrative
construed to implement this policy.”); see also ALAN CHARLES RAUL, PRIVACY AND THE
DIGITAL STATE: BALANCING PUBLIC INFORMATION AND PERSONAL PRIVACY 37 (2002).
327
In the United States, some states like Delaware permit a limited liability company
(LLC) to be set up without providing state officials the name of the members and managers.
See, e.g., 6 DEL. CODE § 18–305 (2015). LLCs are required to include their own ownership
information with tax filings. However, those documents are not public. Indeed, IRC
Section 6103 generally protects tax return information from disclosure to other parties by
an IRS employee. See Disclosure Laws, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/government-entities/
federal-state-local-governments/disclosure-laws [https://perma.cc/D2PB-MTF9].
328
Google Annual Search Statistics, STAT. BRAIN RES. INST., https://www.statisticbrain.
com/google-searches/ [https://perma.cc/FVM2-CLP7]; see also Danny Sullivan, Google
Now Handles at Least 2 Trillion Searches Per Year, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (May 24, 2016,
12:00 PM), https://searchengineland.com/google-now-handles-2-999-trillion-searchesper-year-250247 [https://perma.cc/R28G-QZXM].
329
Transparency Report: Search Removals Under European Privacy Law, GOOGLE,
https://transparencyreport.google.com/eu-privacy/overview?hl=en
[https://perma.cc/84UX-LR5A].
330
Steven M. LoCascio, Forcing Europe to Wear the Rose-Colored Google Glass: The
“Right to Be Forgotten” and the Struggle to Manage Compliance Post, 54 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 297, 329 (2015).
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agency,331 which in effect administers public rights on the basis
of factors such as the existence of alternative solutions, technical
reasons, or duplicate URLs.332 The newsworthiness of the information from a public interest point of view also plays a role in the
company’s decision making on removal requests.333 According to
Google’s presentation of the results of this evaluation process in
a transparency report,334 the search engine company refused to
remove URLs in 55.6% of the cases between May 2014 and May
2019.335 This means that the average number of the pages actually
removed per year is only slightly more than 250,000. Google has
accepted all of the removal requests in those cases (14.2% of the
total requests) where no reference to the requester’s name can be
found in the content page at the provided URL, even though the
individual’s name appears in the URL.336 When we subtract these
35,500 cases which have absolutely no impact on free speech from
the total number of pages that were removed, the number of the
removed pages whose content includes the requester’s name gets
even smaller: about 215,000 pages per year.
Ultimately, the number of removed pages mentioned above
corresponds to one very small fraction of the total pages indexed by
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Edward Lee, Recognizing Rights in Real Time: The Role of Google in the EU Right
to Be Forgotten, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1017, 1072 (2016).
332
The power given to the search engine to determine which links should be erased has
been criticized on different bases. A commentator wrote that “[this] is reinforcing the
dangerous trend toward privatized online censorship.” See Félix Tréguer, Right to Be
Forgotten: With Free Expression Under Threat, Europe Needs a ‘Marco Civil Moment,’
GLOBAL VOICES (Nov. 9, 2014, 5:45 PM), https://globalvoices.org/2014/09/11/right-to-beforgotten-with-free-expression-under-threat-europe-needs-a-marco-civil-moment/
[https://perma.cc/DKR3-TWBW]. Another commentator wrote that “the [ECJ] was less
clear about how Google, or other search engines, should determine which removal requests
to honor.” Daphne Keller, The Right Tools: Europe’s Intermediary Liability Laws and the
EU 2016 General Data Protection Regulation, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 297, 314 (2018).
333
See Transparency Report, supra note 329.
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In May 2015, eighty academics addressed a letter to Google, asking for more
transparency about its evaluation processes. See Ellen P. Goodman, Open Letter to Google
from 80 Internet Scholars: Release RTBF Compliance Data, MEDIUM (May 13, 2015),
https://medium.com/@ellgood/open-letter-to-google-from-80-internet-scholars-releasertbf-compliance-data-cbfc6d59f1bd [https://perma.cc/B4J7-MFYB].
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Transparency Report, supra note 329.
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Id.

2019] TOWARDS A TRANSATLANTIC CONCEPT OF DATA PRIVACY

205

Google, which exceeded 130 trillion pages in 2016.337 The removed
links represent less than 0.0000002% of the pages to which Google
offers access. This number is so small that it is hard to
believe that the ECJ’s ruling has “foray[ed] into the significance
of communication on the Internet,”338 or “unearth[ed] a myriad of
global media law issues,”339 or “effectuat[ed] international censorship in the guise of privacy.”340 On the contrary, the figures
mentioned above demonstrate that, in the EU, the right to privacy
coexists with the right to information and with freedom of expression. The case law of the ECJ restricts the exercise of the right to
erase in circumstances, where the dissemination of information
about an individual constitutes an intrusion into a private matter
without sufficient countervailing public benefits.341
If we believe, like many commentators, that the removal of
a number smaller than 0.0000002% of all the indexed pages is large
enough to infringe freedom of information or freedom of expression,
we should also file complaints against the companies, public authorities, and website operators gathering and disclosing information for
missing links or websites which cover matters being of public
interest. Indeed, 85% of content disappears within a year and 59%
within a week for a number of reasons342: websites are refreshed
every couple of years to keep current with advancements, companies
are taken over or go out of business, websites are blocked by
337

In November 2016, Google mentioned in the “How Google Search Works” page that
it had indexed 130 trillion pages. That figure is up by 100 trillion pages from when Google
announced 30 trillion pages in March 2013. The company has not shared any newer
number. Taking into account the increase of 333% from 2013 to 2016, the number of
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Works, Crawling & Indexing, GOOGLE, www.google.com/search/howsearchworks/
crawling-indexing/ [https://perma.cc/FT2V-YVTZ].
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Post, supra note 35, at 1071.
339
BYRUM, supra note 36, at xiii.
340
McKay Cunningham, Free Expression, Privacy, and Diminishing Sovereignty in the
Information Age: The Internationalization of Censorship, 69 ARK. L. REV. 71, 114 (2016).
341
Case C-131/12, Google Spain v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, 2014
E.C.R. 317, ¶ 81; Case C-398/15, Camera di Commercio, Industria, Artigianato e
Agricoltura di Lecce v. Salvatore Manni, 2016 E.C.R. 652, ¶¶ 47, 64, http://curia.europa.
eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=183142&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&
mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3853759 [https://perma.cc/8Z25-NB83].
342
Meg Leta Ambrose, It’s About Time: Privacy, Information Life Cycles, and the Right
to Be Forgotten, 16 STAN. TECH. L.J. 101, 101 (2013).
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governments or by ISPs, shut down by copy-right holders enforcing
their rights, or sometimes links get broken,343 content gets overwritten for technical reasons even before information is archived.344
The number of broken or lost web pages is much higher than
that of deliberately removed web pages containing personal data.
Oceans of scholarly ink have been spilled on the “inappropriateness” of Google Spain, whose impact is much less important.345
Yet, curiously, there is very little—perhaps no—popular reaction
indicating that this “lost content” prevents people from developing
the “public opinion that is essential to a democracy.”346
Data privacy issues are not limited to the public disclosure of
embarrassing private facts. There are other types of breaches which
undermine the authority of the individual to decide herself or himself, on the basis of the idea of self-determination, when and within
what limits information about her or his private life should be
communicated to others.347 Some numbers recently cited by the

343

The average website lifespan is two years and seven months. See Andy Crestodina,
What Is the Average Website Lifespan? 10 Factors in Website Life Expectancy, ORBIT
MEDIA STUDIOS, www.orbitmedia.com/blog/website-lifespan-and-you/ [https://perma.cc/
RH5R-PCVQ].
344
PAUL BERNAL, THE INTERNET, WARTS AND ALL: FREE SPEECH PRIVACY AND TRUTH 30
(2018).
345
See, e.g., Wilbur Ross, EU Data Privacy Laws Are Likely to Create Barriers to Trade,
FIN. TIMES (May 30, 2018, 12:42 PM), www.ft.com/content/9d261f44-6255-11e8-bdd1cc0534df682c; Bromund, supra note 37; BYRUM, supra note 36, at 111–12 (2018); see
generally David Erdos, European Union Data Protection Law and Media Expression:
Fundamentally Off Balance, 65 INT’L COMP. L.Q. 139 (2016); Emily Adams Shoor,
Narrowing the Right to Be Forgotten: Why the European Union Needs to Amend the
Proposed Data Protection Regulation, 39 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 487 (2014); Patricia Sánchez
Abril & Jacqueline D. Lipton, The Right to Be Forgotten: Who Decides What the World
Forgets, 103 KY. L.J. 363487 (2014); Sophie Curtis & Alice Philipson, Wikipedia
Founder: EU’s Right to Be Forgotten Is “Deeply Immoral,” TELEGRAPH (Aug. 6, 2014,
12:07 PM), www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/wikipedia/11015901/EU-ruling-on-linkremoval-deeply-immoral-says-Wikipedia-founder.html [https://perma.cc/PSM9-L795];
LoCascio, supra note 330; Bromund, supra note 37.
346
Post, supra note 35, at 1042.
347
Personal information can contain financial information such as credit card
information, the disclosure of which can cause financial loss to the user. It can also contain
other information such as political affiliation or medical records, the disclosure of which
can result in non-financial loss such as injury to feelings. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz &
Daniel J. Solove, Reconciling Personal Information in the United States and European
Union, 102 CAL. L. REV. 877, 888–89 (2014). In the United States, the definition of
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CPO (Chief Privacy Officer) Magazine give an idea about the
magnitude of the major data breaches so far348:
Company

Accounts Hacked

Date of Hack

Yahoo!

3 billion

Aug. 2013

Marriott

500 million

2014–2018

Yahoo!

500 million

Late 2014

Adult FriendFinder

412 million

Oct. 2016

MySpace

360 million

May 2016

Under Armor

150 million

Feb. 2018

Equifax

145.5 million

July 2017

Ebay

145 million

May 2014

Target

110 million

Nov. 2013

Heartland Payment Systems

100+ million

May 2008

LinkedIn

100 million

June 2012

Rambler.ru

98 million

Feb. 2012

TJX

94 million

2003–2004

AOL

92 million

2004

personal information varies by the specific jurisdiction and law. In the EU, Article 4(1)
of the GDPR defines “personal data” very broadly as “any information relating to an
identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’).” GDPR, supra note 17, art. 4(1).
348
Matt Powell, 11 Eye Opening Cyber Security Statistics for 2019, CPO MAG. (June 25,
2019), www.cpomagazine.com/cyber-security/11-eye-opening-cyber-security-statisticsfor-2019/ [https://perma.cc/7T6M-7TRN].
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Company

Accounts Hacked

Date of Hack

MyHeritage

92 million

Oct. 2017

Sony PlayStation Network

77 million

Apr. 2011

JP Morgan Chase

83 million

July 2014

Tumblr

65 million

Feb. 2013

Uber

57 million

Late 2016

Home Depot

53 million

Apr. 2014

Facebook

50 million

July 2017

Taking into account the total number of people using the
services provided by each of the companies listed above (e.g. Uber
has around 75 million users),349 the number of hacked accounts
corresponds to a significant proportion of the users (e.g. 57 million
for Uber) and thus represents a grave problem. For all of these
service companies, the proportion of the number of victims of mass
data hacks (e.g. 76% for Uber) is considerably higher than the
0.0000002% of pages actually deleted as a result of Google Spain.
This disparity suggests that the real issue in the context of data
privacy is the data consent policies which do not give users enough
control over the way their information is collected and processed,
and ultimately the mass violation of personal autonomy, rather than
the violation of freedom of expression and the implications of the
right to be de-indexed.
B. Practical Concerns and Approaches in the United States
In the United States, one of the most common arguments courts
rely on to dismiss invasion of privacy claims arising from data
breaches is the absence of sufficient evidence proving direct or

349

See Uber by the Numbers: Users & Drivers Statistics, Demographics, and Fun Facts,
MUCH NEEDED, https://muchneeded.com/uber-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/FH7E-GVJ8].
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actual harm,350 since most data breach cases are based solely on
speculative future harm.351
In In re U.S. Office of Personnel Management Data Security
Breach Litigation (“AFGE v. OPM”), where lawsuits were filed on
the basis of the Privacy Act of 1974 against the Office of Personnel
Management (“OPM”) over data breaches compromising the
records of 22 million federal employees, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia acknowledged the “troubling allegations”
raised by OPM’s victims.352 Nevertheless, the court ruled that “the
fact that a person’s data was taken [is not] enough by itself to create
standing to sue.”353 In In re Science Applications International
Corp., the same court stated that “the degree by which the risk of
harm has increased is irrelevant [to standing]—instead, the question
is whether the harm is certainly impending.”354
In spite of a general tendency to support disclosure, American
courts, just like European courts, have nevertheless consistently
protected personal information—or the “intimate details of one’s
private life”—whose release could cause the individual personal
distress or embarrassment.355 For instance, on June 21, 2019,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed
the district court’s order in AFGE v. OPM granting dismissal of
the complaints discussed above, holding that the plaintiffs’ allegations of potential “future harm” were sufficient for the case to
move forward.356
350

Aranda v. Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 3d 850, 855–56 (N.D. Ill. 2016)
(citing Smith v. Ohio State Univ., 191 F. Supp. 3d 750 (S.D. Ohio 2016); Gubala v. Time
Warner Cable, Inc., No. 15-cv-1078-pp, 2016 WL 3390415, at *1 (E.D. Wisc. June 17,
2016); Khan v. Children’s Nat’l Health Sys., 188 F. Supp. 3d 524 (D. Md. 2016).
351
Khan, 188 F. Supp. 3d, at 529.
352
In re U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 266 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9 (D.D.C.
2017).
353
Id. at 9. The court reasoned that it was “constrained to find that plaintiffs cannot
predicate standing on the basis of the breach alone.” Id. at 20.
354
In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F. Supp.
3d 14, 25 (D.D.C. 2014).
355
Personal information was described by the California Court of Appeal as the “intimate
details of one’s private life.” Wasser v. San Diego Union, 191 Cal. App. 3d 1455, 1460
(1987).
356
In re United States Office of Pers. Mgmt. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 928 F.3d 42, 59
(D.C. Cir. 2019).
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The decisions American courts have made can be divided in two
main categories: (1) collection and use of private information by
government agencies on the basis of the Fourth Amendment, the
FOIA,357 and the Privacy Act of 1974358; and (2) collection and
use of private information by private individuals. A simultaneous
analysis of both categories will produce a global picture of the practical concerns and approaches of American courts that reveals them
to be remarkably similar to the concerns and approaches of the ECJ.
First, I will focus on the balance between access to public
records by government agencies and the privacy rights of the
individuals whose personal information is in those records. As in
Europe, there is a widespread understanding in the United States that
the “open public record allows citizens to oversee their government,
facilitates a vibrant economy, improves efficiency, reduces costs,
creates jobs, and provides valuable products and services that people
want.”359 According to a paper published by the Center for Democracy and Technology, public records in the United States include
driver’s license, driving records, motor vehicle registration, land
titles, property tax records, voting registration records, occupational
licenses, use licenses (e.g. ham radio, CB radio), firearm permits,
court records, bankruptcy filings, civil actions, criminal histories,
divorces, docket information, juror information, wills, law enforcement records, police blotters, jail lists, compiled criminal history
records, political contributions, securities and exchange commission
filings, financial disclosure filings, hunting and fishing licenses,
boat, aircraft and other vehicle titles, and U.S. postal service
address records.360
While providing a broad right of access to these documents
in the possession of the executive branch of the federal government,
the FOIA serves as the vehicle for discovering and reporting
numerous matters of public interest. Although no specific EU law
357

See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018).
See id. § 552a.
359
FRED H. CATE & RICHARD J. VARN, THE PUBLIC RECORD: INFORMATION PRIVACY AND
ACCESS: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR FINDING THE BALANCE 1, 5 (1999), available at
https://it.ojp.gov/documents/d/Public_Record.pdf [https://perma.cc/VN2G-UL84].
360
Robert Gellman, Public Records—Access, Privacy and Public Policy: A Discussion
Paper, 12 GOV’T INFO. Q. 391, 392 (1995).
358
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resembles the FOIA, Manni makes clear that the compilation of a
public register providing official data about an objective situation
cannot, except in specific circumstances, be deemed intrusive into
private life.361 Thus the ECJ’s case law shows that the Court’s
approach resembles that of the FOIA.
According to the ECJ’s ruling, even after a sufficiently long
period of time has elapsed since the specific case in question, only a
few, overriding reasons justify limiting third party access to personal
data.362 The FOIA creates exemptions that address the need for
privacy, in a way similar to the Manni ruling, and finds a middle
ground.363 The justification of this limitation lies in the need for
certain files held by the federal government, which contain information personal enough in nature that its disclosure would very
likely constitute an “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” to
be protected against disclosure.364 Public access to official records
is thus a conditional right in both the United States and in the EU.
A few decisions handed down by American courts reflect the
tensions and complexities regarding the public’s interest in both
access to public records and personal privacy. In Associated Press,
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided, on the basis of
FOIA Exemption 6, that Guantanamo Bay detainees and their
family members have a “measurable privacy interest” in the nondisclosure of their names and identifying information contained in
records regarding allegations of abuse by military personnel and
other detainees.365 The Court highlighted that “a detainee might
want to voluntarily disclose information publicly does not authorize
the government to disclose that information.”366

361

Case C-398/15, Camera di Commercio, Industria, Artigianato e Agricoltura di Lecce
v. Salvatore Manni, 2016 E.C.R. 652, ¶ 63, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=183142&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=f
irst&part=1&cid=3853759 [https://perma.cc/8Z25-NB83].
362
Id. at ¶ 60.
363
See Martin E. Halstuk & Bill F. Chamberlin, The Freedom of Information Act 1966–
2006: A Retrospective on the Rise of Privacy Protection over the Public Interest in
Knowing What the Government’s Up to, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 511, 511 (2006).
364
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2016).
365
Associated Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 554 F.3d 274, 274–79 (2d Cir. 2009).
366
Id. at 287.
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According to the U.S. Justice Department, courts regularly rule
against the disclosure of sensitive personal information regarding
marital status, legitimacy of children, welfare payments, family
fights and reputation, medical condition, date of birth, religious
affiliation, citizenship data, social security numbers, criminal
history records, incarceration of U.S. citizens in foreign prisons,
sexual inclinations or associations, and financial status.367 With
regard to financial status, even though corporations have no privacy
rights, personal financial information is nevertheless protected—
particularly information concerning small businesses when the
individual and corporation are identical.368 In Veneman, a Texan
court ruled that the Department of Agriculture had incorrectly
considered individuals participating in a USDA program as “businesses” because of their ownership of a certain number of livestock
or because of the fact that their ranch had a name.369 The court
concluded that personally identifying information about those
individuals should not be disclosed.370
Disclosing lists of names, telephone numbers, and email
addresses of individuals has frequently been the reason behind
privacy litigation.371 Courts have in effect established a non-official
nondisclosure rule regarding the public release of mailing lists. The
D.C. Circuit, for instance, ruled that mailing lists with the names
and home addresses of federal annuitants were categorically nondisclosable under FOIA’s privacy exemption.372 The Supreme Court
367

See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT, EXEMPTION
6, 480 (2014), available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/
07/23/exemption6_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/W65B-2LMY].
368
See, e.g., Providence Journal Co. v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 460 F. Supp. 778,
785 (D.R.I. 1978), rev’d on other grounds, 602 F.2d 1010 (1st Cir. 1979); Beard v. Espy,
No. 94-16748, 1995 WL 792071, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 11, 1995); Nat’l Parks &
Conservation Ass’n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673, 685–86 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Okla. Publ’g Co.
v. HUD, No. Civ-87-1935-P, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18643, at *4–5 (W.D. Okla. June 17,
1988); DEP’T OF JUST., FOIA UPDATE, VOL. III, NO. 4, 5 (1982), https://www.justice.gov/
oip/blog/foia-update-foia-counselor-questions-answers-24
[https://perma.cc/EZ6MDRKG].
369
Doe v. Veneman, 230 F. Supp. 2d 739, 750 (W.D. Tex. 2002), aff’d in pertinent part
on other grounds, 380 F.3d 807, 818 (5th Cir. 2004).
370
Id. at 749–51, 807.
371
See, e.g., supra notes 7–14 and accompanying text.
372
See Nat’l Ass’n of Retired Fed. Employees v. Horner, 879 F.2d 873, 879 (D.C. Cir.
1989).
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also specifically considered the issue, and held that compilations
of names and home addresses of private citizens are protected
under the privacy exemption,373 although this is not the case for
corporations.374 Moreover, the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence has recognized the intrusiveness of observing personal cell phone data. In Riley, the Court stated that the warrantless
search of the data contained on a cell phone may be even more
intrusive than the search of a home.375 In his reasoning, Chief Justice
John Roberts acknowledged the high value of protecting private
digital information in the search and seizure and public safety
realm.376 The Supreme Court took privacy protection a step further
in Carpenter.377 In this landmark case, the Court ruled that “an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of
his physical movements as captured” through cell phone location
data, and that “the Government must generally obtain a warrant
supported by probable cause before acquiring such records.”378
These decisions demonstrate that, in the evaluation criteria
determining whether private data collected by government agencies
should be made publicly available, American courts are not
indifferent to the nature of the information in question, its sensitivity
for the data subject’s private life, the data subject’s identity, the
purpose of its storage and disclosure, and the public’s concern or
interest in the information. The approach of American courts in the
evaluation of the collection and use of information by private
individuals or non-governmental entities likewise is to examine
fundamental rights and other relevant interests on a case-by-case
basis. Particularly the seminal 2001 case Bartnicki, which has set off
373

See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE (2004),
https://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-guide-2004-edition-exemption-6#exemption
[https://perma.cc/25NM-NT5Q]; see also Bibles v. Oregon Natural Dessert Ass’n, 519
U.S. 355 (1997); U.S. Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 114 S. Ct. 1006 (1994).
374
In Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, the Court denied
the personal privacy FOIA exemption to corporations. 489 U.S. 749, 749 (1989). For more
on this case, see generally Patrick C. File, A History of Practical Obscurity: Clarifying and
Contemplating the Twentieth Century Roots of a Digital Age Concept of Privacy, 6 U.
BALT. J. MEDIA L. & ETHICS 4 (2017).
375
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014).
376
Id. at 2494–95.
377
See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
378
Id. at 2217, 2221.
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a wrenching debate over the privacy values society is actually
willing to protect, illustrates well the Supreme Court’s approach to
the publication of data breaches.379 While the case is not very recent,
its principles still apply today. Moreover, the holding of the Court
is flexible enough to deal with technological advances in communications and media research.380
In Bartnicki, the Court analyzed the constitutionality of
restrictions on publishing information381 illegally obtained through
the interception of phone conversations.382 The Court set forth
a three-prong balancing test that examines the conduct of the
defendant, the nature of the disclosure, and the importance of the
disclosure for the public interest. According to the Court, matters
of public concern or interest are newsworthy matters that relate
to current events.383 From the point of view of this Article, this raises
the question as to whether search engine companies have the right
in the United States to facilitate the publication and dissemination
of personal information that does not deal with current,
newsworthy subjects.384
Financial records, such as social security debts (as in Google
Spain), cannot be considered newsworthy.385 The main reason
379

See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 121 S. Ct. 1753 (2001).
Richard D. Shoop, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 449, 461 (2002).
381
Bartnicki, 121 S. Ct. at 1756. For similar cases, see, e.g., Boehner v. McDermott, 191
F.3d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 532 U.S. 1050, 121 S. Ct. 2190; Peavy v. WFAATV, Inc., 37 F. Supp. 2d 495 (N.D. Tex. 1999), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 221 F.3d 158
(5th Cir. 2000). See also Eric Easton, Ten Years After: Bartnicki v. Vopper as Laboratory
for First Amendment Advocacy and Analysis, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 287, 294 (2011).
382
See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2012) (stating that “[e]xcept as otherwise specifically
provided in this chapter any person who . . . (c) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to
disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication,
knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the
interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this subsection . . .
shall be punished . . . .”).
383
See Bartnicki, 121 S. Ct. at 1760; see also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
384
Bartnicki, 121 S. Ct. at 1760.
385
See, e.g., Painting and Drywall Work Pres. Fund v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 936
F.2d 1300, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Hopkins v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 929 F.2d
81, 87 (2d Cir. 1991); Robyn v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 774 F. Supp. 587, 592 (D. Colo.
1991); Adams v. Murakami, 813 P.2d 1348, 1365 (Cal. 1991) (Mosk, J., dissenting); Doyle
v. State Bar, 648 P.2d 942, 945 (Cal. 1982); Valley Bank of Nev. v. Superior Court, 15
380
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behind the Supreme Court granting Congress permission to restrict
the speech of consumer reporting agencies and financial institutions
is that consumer reports and private financial records are confidential and cannot be deemed to be newsworthy,386 since, in ordinary
circumstances, this type of information can be described as the
“intimate details of one’s private life.”387 Besides financial records,388 due to their confidentiality, other types of sensitive personal
information, such as medical conditions, religious affiliations,
and sexual inclinations or associations are accessible only to authorized parties that need the information for permissible purposes
(e.g., employment purposes, credit transactions, or insurance underwriting).389 The requirement of permissible purposes constitutes a
precaution to stop unauthorized third parties from disclosing personal information that is not newsworthy or has become obsolete.390
The judicial approach just described is similar to that taken by
the ECJ in Google Spain, where the Court required the search engine
company to delist personal information as long as the information is
“no longer relevant” or, in the words of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Bartnicki, no longer newsworthy.391 An unflattering old piece of
news, for instance, is less newsworthy than new information, as in
general it lacks public interest. As the Supreme Court of California
highlighted in Shulman, even an individual unwillingly involved in
a newsworthy incident does not surrender all rights to privacy, and
not everything said or done by that person is newsworthy392:

Cal.3d 652, 656 (Cal. 1975); City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 466 P.2d 225, 231 (Cal.
1970); Terry York Imports, Inc. v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 242 Cal. Rptr. 790, 797 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1987); Tollefson v. Price, 430 P.2d 990, 992 (Ore. 1967); Palmisano v. Toth, 624
A.2d 314, 318–19 (R.I. 1993).
386
See supra note 385; see generally United States v. Bormes, 133. S. Ct. 12 (2012);
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011); Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.,
550 U.S. 1 (2007).
387
Wasser v. San Diego Union, 236 Cal. Rptr. 772, 775 (1987).
388
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b).
389
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 367, at 480.
390
See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 202, at 750–51 (5th ed. 2014).
391
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 121 S. Ct. 1753, 1776 (2001).
392
See Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc. 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998); see also Gary
L. Bostwick, The Newsworthiness Element: Shulman v. Group W. Prods., Inc. Muddies the
Waters, 19 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 225, 239–40 (1999).
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First, the analysis of newsworthiness does involve
courts to some degree in a normative assessment
of the ‘social value’ of a publication. . . . All material
that might attract readers or viewers is not, simply
by virtue of its attractiveness, of legitimate public
interest. Second, the evaluation of newsworthiness
depends on the degree of intrusion and the extent to
which the plaintiff played an important role in public
events . . . , and thus on a comparison between the
information revealed and the nature of the activity or
event that brought the plaintiff to public attention.393
Another point that the Bartnicki Court highlighted is the fact
that the First Amendment protection is not absolute, but rather is
conditioned upon whether personal information is obtained through
proper means (e.g., via a permissible purpose or express consent) or
in an unlawful way.394 The Court decided that broadcasting the
stolen audio recording in question benefited from the protection
offered by the First Amendment on account of the public importance
of the recording, and on account of the fact that the defendant was
not responsible for the initial breach although he was aware the
recording had been obtained illegally.395 The Court specified it
would consider punishing disclosure should the disclosing party
have engaged in illegal activity to procure the information.396
Indeed, as Dean Post pointed out, “the First Amendment has
traditionally been dedicated to the creation of free public opinion,
not to the creation of public knowledge.”397 In Dahlstrom, the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit used the Bartnicki three-part test
to determine that the First Amendment did not protect the Chicago
Sun Times from liability for publishing personal information about
five police officers that it had illegally obtained from government
records and published without permission, because the information
was not of sufficiently high public interest.398 The Court highlighted

393
394
395
396
397
398

Shulman, 955 P.2d at 483–84 (citations omitted).
See Bartnicki, 121 S. Ct. at 1760, 1764.
See id.
See id. at 1762.
Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 487 (2011).
Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC, 777 F.3d 937, 940–41, 954 (7th Cir. 2015).
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the Supreme Court’s holding in Branzburg399 that the First Amendment “does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special
access to information not available to the public generally.”400
In respect of privacy and free communication, the social norms
and values embodied in the United States law do not substantially
differ from those of the EU law. Courts on both sides of the Atlantic
are reluctant to accept a possible pre-determined hierarchy between
data protection and the free flow of information in society. Data
protection does not automatically override freedom of the press and
freedom of expression or vice versa.401 Decisions are based on
an issue-by-issue examination of different fundamental rights, and
other interests.402
In addition to practical solutions, some procedural principles
and applications in terms of access to justice once data has been
allegedly misused, too, are similar on both sides of the Atlantic.
Influenced by the U.S. model, Article 80, section 1 of the GDPR
gives individuals the right to bring a collective legal action in
case of intrusion of privacy, an innovative type of action for the continental European legal tradition.403 Although the new European
399

Id. at 946 (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 92 S. Ct. 2646 (1972)).
Branzburg, 92 S. Ct. at 2658.
401
In the United States, see Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 97 S. Ct. 2849
(1977) (pointing out the limits the First Amendment places on the right of entertainers to
control public dissemination of their performances, and ruling for the entertainer stating
that the First Amendment does not give the broadcaster the right to appropriate the
entertainer’s entire act). In the EU, see Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia
Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, 2014 E.C.R. 317; Case C-398/15, Camera di Commercio,
Industria, Artigianato e Agricoltura di Lecce v. Salvatore Manni, 2016 E.C.R. 652,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=183142&pageIndex=0
&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3853759 [https://perma.cc/8Z25NB83].
402
In the United States, see, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 121 S. Ct. 1753, 1753 (2001). In
the EU, see, e.g., Case C-92/09, Volker und Markus Schecke GbR v. Land Hessen, 2010
E.C.R. I-11063, ¶ 48; Case C-543/09, Deutsche Telekom AG v. Bundesrepublik
Deutschland, 2011 E.C.R. 279 ¶ 51, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
?uri=CELEX%3A62009CJ0543 [https://perma.cc/2BXJ-VB7C]; Case C-291/12, Michael
Schwarz v. Stadt Bochum, 2013 E.C.R. 401 ¶ 33, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.
jsf?celex=62012CC0291&lang1=en&type=TXT&ancre= [https://perma.cc/XPT8-3VPL].
403
GDPR, supra note 17, art. 80 (“The data subject shall have the right to mandate a notfor-profit body, organisation or association which has been properly constituted in
accordance with the law of a Member State, has statutory objectives which are in the public
interest, and is active in the field of the protection of data subjects’ rights and freedoms
400

218

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXX:139

opt-in collective action falls short of the American opt-out class
action right, it can be viewed as a first move towards increasing the
number of group privacy claims in Europe. By establishing in the
GDPR collective redress methods, the EU legislature has taken an
important step forward in permitting consumers and members of
labor unions to come together as a group, assert their privacy rights,
and seek redress by way of claiming compensation.404
While the EU legislature seems willing to expand collective
action on the basis of a model seeking to avoid the kind of frivolous
suits that many Europeans—with or without basis—associate with
American class action practice,405 it is noteworthy that similar concerns have arisen within the United States.406 As Professors Gelbach
and Hensler noted, “nearly a decade’s worth of U.S. Supreme
Court cases have restricted the scope and ease of use of the class
action device.”407 Worries regarding potential abuse and misuse of
class actions in data protection cases, among others, appear to be
motivating legislatures and courts on both sides of the Atlantic to be
cautious. This is a significant indicator suggesting that not only their
substantive law on data protection, but also their procedural law
governing the administration of privacy policies in general have
started converging as a result of increased interaction between the
legal cultures of the United States and the EU.
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CONCLUSION
Oscar Wilde was correct when he said that no man is rich
enough to buy back his past.408 One should assume guilt for past
wrongdoing, but should also look forward to the future. That is why
Wilde’s premise must not be understood as implying that personal
data should be disclosed without any restriction. I have analyzed the
tension that exists on both sides of the Atlantic between the public’s
right to access information and data privacy. I have paid particular
attention to the way recent advances, especially regarding communication technology and social media, have affected:
i)

the perceptions of privacy and that of
freedom of expression,
ii)
the current and prospective reaction of the
lawmaker in framing policies that aim at
maximizing both interests, and
iii)
the standards and tests that courts use to
evaluate the dynamics between rights and
responsibilities.
I have also asked whether and to what extent there is a similar
legislative and judicial evolution in the United States and the EU.
My goal has been to demonstrate, from both practical and
conceptual perspectives, the dynamic nature of the multitude of
variables that influence any decision regarding a possible loss of
privacy or restriction of freedom of expression.
My analysis shows that, through Google Spain and the adoption
of the GDPR, EU law has shaped, to some degree, the evolution of
American public policy. In this matter, EU law has perhaps been
more influential than American privacy lobbyists. Yet, changes and
initiatives at the state as well as national level do not solely result
from an apparent economic threat from Europe, but also from a
number of concerns regarding data security that have arisen within
the United States. Recent statistics illustrate that most people are
concerned about the ability of businesses to safeguard their financial
and personal information. These concerns, along with several class
action lawsuits filed following data leakage or contamination, show
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in a roundabout way the inefficiency of the system when it comes
to protecting personal information in a satisfactory manner. There
is a desire to settle the issue thanks to new legislative measures,
instead of relying on the existing legal rules or the case law
developing ad hoc exceptions to existing rules. One of the reasons
for this desire is that the Privacy by Design principles, which require
relatively costly implementation processes, have not yet been followed by businesses.
American legislative frameworks, such as the CCPA, that
borrow the core principles of the GDPR, are directed toward
broadening the scope of data security. These American regimes
permit an effective and comprehensive protection, without compromising the promotion of a free, open, and transparent society and
market. They grant consumers, among others, a right similar to the
right to erase conferred to EU citizens following Google Spain.
Nevertheless, this legislative entitlement is not an unrestricted right
to erase anything that we dislike from the Internet. In fact, figures
provided by Google so far show that the number of removed pages
is much less important than the number of web pages broken or lost
every year, and corresponds to an extremely small percentage (well
below 0.0000002%) of all the pages indexed by Google.
On both sides of the Atlantic, the criteria adopted by the
legislature in defining the penumbras of (data) privacy in general,
and of the right to erase in particular, do not disregard the principles
and standards set forth by case law. In the EU, a combined reading
of Google Spain, Manni, and local decisions, such as the one handed
down by the Court of Amsterdam, makes it clear that the law
protects citizens against outdated or irrelevant links to search results
that may intrude on a person’s privacy. EU citizens are not entitled
to insist that all negative communications about them be removed
from the Internet. The nature of the information in question, its
sensitivity for the data subject, the data subject’s identity (private or
corporate), the purpose (profit-making or non-profit public service)
of its storage and disclosure, and the public’s concern or interest in
the information are among the factors that influence the evaluation
of the scope of the right to erase personal information. Ultimately,
the exercise of the right to erase does not affect the existence of
content, but merely the search results.
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There is a noticeable parallel between the efforts of American
courts and of European courts to find an approach that maximizes
both freedom of expression and data security. Rulings such as
Bartnicki, Shulman, Associated Press, and Carpenter demonstrate
that American courts have adopted an ambivalent approach towards
data protection. There is no monolithic test that weighs privacy and
public interests. Courts weigh various interests, such as the “social
value” of a publication and the importance of the role played by the
plaintiff in the public events, and in each case the court makes an
effort to establish a balance between protecting information that is
not newsworthy or of legitimate public concern and broad public
access to information that is not acutely personal. In such an evaluation, not only are nature and origin of the information in question
significant factors, but so too is the way the information was
obtained. The publication of private information, particularly in
cases where it is not of public concern or was obtained without
consent, leads to similar results on both sides of the Atlantic.
Although American and European legal cultures do assign
different meanings to “public concern” and “consent,” it would
nevertheless be an exaggeration to assert that, as a result of their
differences, data privacy law in the United States and the EU offer
conflicting solutions. Difference does not automatically imply
incompatibility. A deeper analysis of their legislative efforts, case
laws, and procedural rules reveal that neither U.S. law nor EU law
can be contextualized through a black-and-white approach. On the
contrary, the tests, criteria and thresholds used to define data privacy
illustrate, on both sides of the Atlantic, the complex and dynamic
nature of its assessment. Recent developments show that the
principles that underpin such an assessment in the United States and
the EU are getting closer. This convergence makes it likely that, in
the long run, American and European governmental institutions and
courts will reach similar conclusions when they decide privacy or
data security cases presenting similar facts.

